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ABSTRACT
Various approaches to conceptualizing and measuring intelligence have been 
utilized throughout history. Despite the plethora o f intelligence theories, the field of 
industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology has been largely dominated by the 
psychometric tradition of intelligence and Spearman’s general factor theory of 
intelligence (g). Moreover, other approaches to intelligence (e.g., the developmental 
perspective) have generally been ignored by 1-0 psychology. This is puzzling given the 
widespread acceptance among 1-0 psychologists of intelligence’s substantial and 
increasing importance in the modem workplace.
Supported by a vast amount of research, g  has often been recognized as the single 
best predictor of job performance. However, traditional measures of g have reached a 
plateau in terms of predictive validity for work-related criteria. Although g  is not the sole 
determinate of job performance, failing to incorporate advancements from other fields 
(e.g., developmental psychology, cognitive psychology) is a potential limitation to 
continued improvement of job-performance prediction. One modem approach to 
intelligence that holds promise for improving our prediction of performance in the 
workplace is known collectively as the intellectual-investment theories, which posit that 
intellectual development is partially influenced by investment traits (e.g., Openness to 
Experience) that guide how, where, and when individuals invest their cognitive ability.
Stemming from this investment, individual differences in crystallized intelligence (Gc), a 
particular type of intelligence that largely increases throughout one’s lifespan, are thought 
to result.
Using the intellectual-investment framework, this study sought to improve the 
prediction of job performance longitudinally by accounting for both intelligence and 
personality. To this end, latent-growth modeling was applied to archival personality, 
crystallized-intelligence, and job-performance data obtained from 92 employees. Overall, 
no support was found for the intellectual-investment framework in predicting job 
performance longitudinally, but a theoretical contribution was made and the study offers 
practical suggestions based on theory and research. In addition, a number of limitations to 
this study are discussed that are believed to contribute to the lack of support. In 
conclusion, the intellectual-investment framework offers the potential for improved job 
performance prediction and as such, this study offers suggestions that researchers can 
incorporate into future studies.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Due to the increasing complexities and constant change of the modem workplace, 
intelligence has arguably become one of the most important individual-difference 
predictors of job performance (Gatewood, Feild, & Barrick, 2007). Indeed, research in 
industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology has pointed to intelligence’s importance in 
personnel selection (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). In particular, research suggests that 
intelligence is the single best predictor of success on the job (Hunter & Hunter, 1984; 
Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Although debate about the use of intelligence testing in the 
workplace continues (e.g., social and legal ramifications), there appears to be widespread 
acceptance of intelligence’s importance in the field of 1-0 psychology (Murphy, Cronin, 
& Tam, 2003). Moreover, Murphy et al. (2003) found that among the 1-0 psychologists 
who responded to their survey about the use of cognitive ability in the workplace, the vast 
majority believed that intelligence would continue to increase in importance as the 
requirements for successful job performance rise in complexity.
Despite its perceived importance in 1-0 psychology, Scherbaum, Goldstein, 
Yusko, Ryan, and Hanges (2012) argued that little research has been conducted on the 
underlying nature and measurement of intelligence over the last few decades. In other 
fields (e.g., developmental and cognitive psychology), advancements have been made in 
the understanding of intelligence (Reeve, Scherbaum, & Goldstein, 2015; Scherbaum &
1
2Goldstein, 2015). Moreover, modem intelligence research has provided new insights 
about the construct, yet the field of 1-0 psychology has been slow to use and integrate 
these developments (Reeve et al., 2015; Scherbaum et al., 2012). Incorporating these 
advances (e.g., modem intghelligence theory) from other fields could provide 1-0 
psychology with positive benefits, including the improvement of job-performance 
prediction (Agnello, Ryan, & Yusko, 2015; Reeve et al., 2015).
Why is it the case that 1-0 psychology has not adopted these new findings? As 
some have argued (e.g., Goldstein, Zedeck, & Goldstein, 2002; Murphy, 1996), 1-0 
psychology’s success at providing evidence of the generalizable relationship between 
intelligence and job performance has largely inhibited further investigation into the 
nature of intelligence. Indeed, Goldstein et al. (2002) suggested that there is a tendency in 
1-0 psychology to view the relationship between intelligence and job performance as 
being an open-and-shut case. Given its importance, it seems time that 1-0 researchers and 
practitioners reopen the case of intelligence and incorporate advancements and findings 
from other fields to improve the understanding of human behavior at work (Agnello et 
al., 2015; Goldstein et al., 2002; Reeve et al., 2015; Scherbaum et al., 2012). The theories 
from which a researcher adopting this position has to choose are many and result from a 
complex, centuries-long process of development; accordingly, to narrow the pool of 
candidate theories for adoption, an exploration of the history of intelligence 
conceptualization and testing is necessary. To this end, the study will address this 
research gap by incorporating modem intelligence theory (intellectual investment 
theories) that postulates that certain personality traits (e.g., Openness to Experience) 
influence the development of a specific cognitive ability (i.e., crystallized intelligence).
3Thus, accounting for both personality and intelligence is expected to better predict job 
performance longitudinally, which will benefit both researchers and practitioners in the I- 
O psychology field.
Historical Overview of Intelligence Testing
The notion of some individuals being more clever and gifted than other 
individuals has likely always existed in human culture and civilization (Chamorro- 
Premuzic & Fumham, 2005). Despite this length of time, a universally-accepted 
definition of the intelligence or cognitive-ability (an alternative label) construct, which 
describes individual differences in “mental capabilities” (Ones, Dilchert, & Viswesvaran, 
2012), remains elusive (Neisser et al., 1996; Sternberg, & Detterman, 1986; Wechsler, 
1975). In particular, different fields of study frequently create definitions of intelligence 
that place greater emphasis on certain aspects over others, often completely excluding 
particular aspects (Wechsler, 1975). In applied psychology, Ones et al. (2012) noted a 
particularly useful definition of intelligence, offered in Gottffedson (1997). They defined 
intelligence as,
A very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to 
reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn 
quickly and learn from experience. It is not merely book learning, a narrow 
academic skill, or test taking smarts. Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper 
capability for comprehending our surroundings— ‘catching on,’ ‘making sense’ of 
things, or ‘figuring out’ what to do. (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 13)
Many other definitions of intelligence have existed (Wechsler, 1975) and one likely 
reason for such diversity is the importance associated with understanding and developing
4adequate measures for the construct (Scherbaum et al., 2012). Indeed, numerous such 
attempts have been made throughout history. From an historical perspective, Chamorro- 
Premuzic and Fumham (2005) argued that the scientific study of and attempt to 
conceptualize individual intelligence have their origins in the 1800s. Yet, others (e.g., 
Bowman, 1989; Doyle, 1974; Dubois, 1965,1970) have argued that understanding the 
importance of and the capability to measure intelligence dates further back in human 
history.
Doyle (1974) indicated that around 2,500 years ago, the ancient Greeks used 
ability testing designed to encompass and assess the different aspects that characterized 
an ideal member of Greek society. Ability testing was used to supplement ancient 
Greece’s educational system and aid in the personnel selection for state services 
(Anastasi, 1993; Doyle, 1974). As such, the Greeks were very interested in the theory and 
practice of both mental and physical testing (Doyle, 1974). Moreover, historical records, 
particularly in the writings of Aristotle and Plato, indicate the Greeks were interested in 
assessing individuals’ future ability level given their current ability (aptitude testing) as 
well as their cumulated body of knowledge (achievement testing; Doyle, 1974). Although 
testing physical ability was often emphasized to a greater extent, mental achievement and 
aptitude tests were utilized, but to the ancient Greeks, the notion of such tests were 
largely informed by the characteristics of what they considered to be an ideal member of 
society (Anastasi, 1993; Doyle, 1974).
The Greek’s conceptualization of intelligence was not exactly the same as other 
ancient societies. The ancient Chinese, for instance, widely used ability testing for a 
variety of purposes (Bowman, 1989; Dubois, 1965,1970). In roughly 150 BCE, the
5emperors of the Qin or early Han dynasties implemented written examination programs 
(Bowman, 1989). While non-written selection assessments may have existed prior to this 
time, written examinations were used in selecting individuals for civil service positions.
In addition, the written examinations were used to occasionally reevaluate the abilities of 
the selected officials. Dubois (1970) noted that an ancient Chinese emperor used 
examinations every three years to assess whether his officials were still capable of 
continued service. Despite their use in selection and evaluation, ability testing 
experienced a decline after the Qin or early Han dynasties, but reemerged in ancient 
China around the T’ang dynasty (618-906 CE; Bowman, 1989).
With the arrival of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), Bowman (1989) noted that the 
civil service examinations had become highly developed and a formal social institution. 
The examinations were used to select individuals for positions among different levels 
(i.e., municipal, county, provincial, national). Moreover, examination results helped 
assign individuals formal titles and as Bowman (1989) described, “at each level, 
[examination] success yielded further titles and access to more power in the civil service” 
(p. 557). The system had become quite sophisticated by the height of the Ming dynasty, 
efficiently differentiating talent to serve positions at different levels of government. To 
the ancient Chinese, talented individuals were “those who showed very high levels of 
verbal cleverness and the capacity to build up elegant, abstract arguments with almost the 
quality of word games” (Bowman, 1989, p. 578). Hence, the Chinese assessed ability in a 
more linguistic sense, than did the ancient Greeks. Testing in the civil service system 
continued to develop for hundreds of years, which in essence made ability testing very 
much a part of Chinese society. Indeed, compared to the ancient Greek’s “test-influenced
society” (Doyle, 1974), Dubois (1965) argued that ancient China was a “test-dominated 
society.” Yet, despite China’s long history of testing, the modem view of intelligence is 
largely influenced by work done during the 1800s. That being said, the Chinese tradition 
is still meaningful to modem intelligence theory due to its large focus on linguistic skill, 
which is similar to crystallized ability, a more recent concept that will be discussed later.
Anastasi (1993) argued that the modem ability testing movement could be traced 
back to the work of Francis Galton. Moreover, Galton is often credited for influencing the 
foundation of a science devoted to studying mental abilities (Chamorro-Premuzic & 
Fumham, 2005; Reeve & Bonaccio, 2011). Influenced by his cousin Charles Darwin’s 
(1859) theory of natural selection, Galton (1865, 1869) suggested that “genius” was 
largely hereditary and introduced the notion of general mental ability as an individual 
difference factor into the field of psychology (Reeve & Bonaccio, 2011). Further, Galton 
(1869), primarily through the study of giftedness within families, considered general 
mental ability (as opposed to specialized abilities) as the primary individual characteristic 
responsible for differences among individuals pursuing intellectual activities. The 
combination of such information influenced Galton (1869) to argue that the human 
population could be improved if two individuals with desirable traits produced offspring. 
As Galton (1865) explained, “if talented men were mated with talented women, of the 
same mental and physical characters as themselves, generation after generation, we might 
produce a highly-bred human race” (p. 319). Thus, Galton realized that a systematic way 
to measure such characteristics was needed (Anastasi, 1993); measures that “had been so 
developed as to embrace every important quality of mind and body” (Galton, 1865, p. 
165).
7In Galton’s (1883) Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development, he 
proposed that to measure one’s intellectual strengths and weaknesses, a number of mental 
tests should be administered. Beginning in 1884, Galton started using various tests to 
collect data from the general public at his London-based Anthropometric Laboratory. The 
tests assessed different aspects of a person, including muscle strength, sensory 
discrimination, motor coordination, reaction time, and physical features (e.g., height, 
weight; Galton, 1888). These mental tests were the basis of his “theory of cognitive 
abilities” (Carroll, 1993, p. 31). This conceptualization of intelligence differed from the 
ideal-member-of-society and linguistic approach of the ancient Greeks and Chinese, 
respectively. That is, Galton believed different aspects of a person (e.g., height, muscle 
strength) collectively indicated one’s intelligence. Moreover, Galton thought the 
differences observed on the tests could serve as a representation of an individual’s mental 
ability capacity (Galton, 1883). Hence, Galton did not focus on the ideal characteristics of 
society members or linguistic ability. The idea that intelligence could be assessed using 
aspects of a person (e.g., muscular strength, weight) would be attempted by another 
researcher as well.
James Cattell adopted a similar measurement approach to studying intelligence as 
that of Galton (Anastasi, 1993). J. M. Cattell (1890) identified and used ten tests thought 
to measure fundamental psychological functioning of mental ability. The mental tests 
included measures such as tactile discrimination, memory, sound reaction time, and 
hearing (J. M. Cattell, 1890). However, the evaluations of J. M. Cattell’s mental tests 
were discouraging. As Anastasi (1993) noted, the performance (or score) on one test had 
little relationship with the performance on another test. Moreover, performance across the
8tests had low correspondence to academic and life outcomes, which suggested the tests 
were not a proxy for intelligence. In short, the results were a disappointment. However, 
the lack of empirical support for the basic sensory functioning approach to intelligence 
(examined by Galton and J. M. Cattell) suggested a need for a new approach. Indeed, in 
the years that followed, another approach to conceptualizing and measuring intelligence 
would expand the understanding of intelligence.
Instead of measuring intelligence solely through basic sensory functioning, Alfred 
Binet proposed an alternative approach that attempted to capture complex, higher-order 
mental processes (Binet, 1903). Binet and Simon (1905/1916) believed intelligence 
consisted of an important capability and as the authors noted, “this faculty is judgment” 
(p. 42). They further explained, “to judge well, to comprehend well, to reason well, these 
are the essential activities of intelligence” (p. 43). In 1904, the government of France 
provided Binet the opportunity to identify learning-challenged schoolchildren, which 
afforded him the chance to translate his conceptualization of intelligence into practice 
(Anastasi, 1993). As a result of this, Binet and Simon (1905/1916) created a standardized 
measure of intelligence that attempted to capture both judging and reasoning ability.
The items used in Binet and Simon’s (1905/1916) intelligence scales were chosen 
based on two primary purposes (Ackerman, 2013). The first was differentiation by age, 
which assumed, on average, that intelligence abilities increased with age. As such, older 
children were expected to outperform younger children on a more difficult item (all 
things being equal), item difficulty being determined by the proportion of children 
(across all chronological ages) successfully completing an item. Moreover, young 
children with high intelligence tend to become older children with high intelligence (the
9same being true for lower intelligence). Items that failed to meet this assumption were not 
included in the assessment. The reader may note that items failing to meet this 
assumption could have been insensitive to age-related differences or inversely sensitive 
or that the removed items may have been tapping some other capability. Thus, excluding 
such items may have limited further refinements to their conceptualization of 
intelligence. Secondly, multiple items that comprised an intelligence scale were expected 
to be associated with school outcomes (i.e., success, failure). That is, intelligence scales 
were kept in the assessment if they correlated with school outcomes. The reader may note 
that the removed scales could have been tapping another outcome (e.g., ability to solve 
novel problems outside of the school domain). The scores obtained on the scales were 
indicated by “mental age,” which was based on average chronological age performance. 
Namely, an individual with a mental age of 9 performed as well as the average 9-year- 
old. Binet and Simon’s intelligence scales had an incredible impact on the measurement 
of intelligence. Indeed, Mackintosh (2011) described its importance as having “formed 
the basis of modem [intelligence] tests” (p. 14).
While a few researchers examined the application of Binet-and-Simon-type 
ability scales to the study of adults, the first large-scale assessment of adult intelligence 
was created during the First World War (Ackerman, 2013). During World War I, the U.S. 
Army wanted a test that could assess adult intelligence and be administered to large 
numbers of individuals. Because the Binet-and-Simon-type intelligence tests required 
one-on-one administration by a qualified psychological assessor, they were too costly and 
inefficient for assessing large number of U.S. Army recruits (Mackintosh, 2011). As 
such, the president o f the American Psychological Association, Robert Yerkes, guided
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the development efforts to create mass-administered intelligence tests. Two tests resulted 
from these efforts; namely, the Army Alpha for literate individuals and Army Beta for 
illiterate individuals (Ackerman, 2013). The Army tests measured intelligence in a way 
that “mirrored the Binet scales in content (e.g., tests of arithmetic, analogies, general 
information, synonyms and antonyms)” (Ackerman, 2013, p. 120). Thus, the ideas of 
measuring intelligence did not change drastically from Binet and Simon, but the test 
format certainly did. With the new test format, over a million individuals were assessed 
during the war effort (Ackerman, 1996). Mackintosh (2011) noted the impact saying, “the 
Army tests.. .wrought a transformation in the public’s attitude to mental tests” (p. 17). 
Indeed, following World War I, commercially available intelligence tests have been 
widely used in both educational and organizational settings (Wasserman & Tulsky,
2005). Though various conceptualizations and measurement practices have been 
embraced throughout history, this adoption of Binet’s approach to intelligence had 
theoretical implications for this new era of testing. Namely, the focus on complex higher- 
order mental processes largely ignored other intellectual capabilities that developed over 
time, such as the ancient Chinese’s assessment of language ability. However, the 
considerations of intellectual abilities that develop over time (e.g., vocabulary) have 
recently reemerged in modem theories of intelligence (e.g., R. B. Cattell, 1943). That 
being said, the advancement of mass-administered intelligence tests that measure 
complex mental processes made during World War I effectively ushered in a new age of 
intelligence testing that has continued to influence our thinking about intelligence.
11
Psychometric Tradition of Intelligence
Since the advent of statistical techniques in the early 1900s, there have 
traditionally been two approaches to studying intelligence; namely, the psychometric and 
the developmental perspective (Reeve & Bonaccio, 2011). The distinction between the 
two approaches corresponds roughly to either focusing on the underlying structure of 
basic cognitive ability (i.e., psychometric perspective) or the acquisition of knowledge 
and skills (i.e., developmental perspective). The former has primarily used quantitative 
methods (e.g., factor analysis) when investigating intelligence, while the latter has often 
focused on understanding how knowledge acquisition occurs over time. Though theories 
of intelligence have been developed that better integrate the two perspectives (e.g., 
Ackerman, 1996; R. B. Cattell, 1943), the field of 1-0 psychology has largely remained 
dominated by the psychometric perspective of intelligence (Agnello et al., 2015; Reeve et 
al., 2015; Murphy et al., 2003; Scherbaum et al., 2012; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998).
The origins of the psychometric approach to intelligence largely resulted from the 
work of Charles Spearman (1863-1945; Agnello et al., 2015). In 1904, occurring around 
the same time as the work of Binet and Simon, Spearman was influenced by Galton’s 
proposals of intelligence. Indeed, Spearman (1904) examined the relationship between 
sensory discrimination (e.g., weight, light, visual) and intelligence in school children. 
Spearman (1904) found individual differences in sensory discrimination to be strongly 
related to what he deemed “General Intelligence,” but much of his later research would 
focus on his observation of commonalities among different ability tests and their 
relationship with children’s school grades (Drasgow, 2003). Spearman (1904) described 
the highly intercorrelated tests and grades saying, “whenever branches of intellectual
12
activity are at all dissimilar, then their correlations with one another appear wholly due to 
their being all variously saturated with some common fundamental function” (p. 273). 
That is, mental activities appearing unrelated (e.g., math, language, music) generally 
show similar patterns (e.g., individuals good in math tend to be equally good in language) 
and as such, the similarities are due to an underlying, single factor. Hence, a single factor 
could generally account for the high interconnectedness among the tests and grades, 
though each variable (e.g., tests, grades) had varying levels of saturation with the single 
factor. He described a variable’s saturation with the single factor as the “extent to which 
the considered faculty is functionally identical with General Intelligence” (p. 276).
Spearman’s (1904) findings implied that individuals that performed well on one 
intelligence test would likely perform well on another intelligence test. Indeed, he 
referred to this phenomenon of only positive intercorrelations as “positive manifold” 
(Reeve & Bonaccio, 2011). That is, similar performance on different intelligence tests 
(e.g., math, verbal) would be observed if the tests were positively related. However, he 
understood that a single underlying factor could not explain all the variance associated 
with each variable (e.g., course grades) and the remaining variance could be explained by 
statistical error, unique variance, or both, which led him to propose a two-factor theory of 
intelligence (Carroll, 1993; Spearman, 1927). The superordinate factor was signified as g 
(or general mental ability) and the subordinate factor consisted of many specific abilities, 
not one particular ability. As such, Spearman presumed that g  influenced performance in 
every domain and that specific abilities accounted for the variance g  did not explain in 
specific domains (e.g., math course grade, music; Drasgow, 2003). That is, performance
in a domain was influenced by a combination of g, a domain specific factor, and 
statistical error.
Through his study of g, Spearman introduced a new statistical methodology (i.e., 
factor analysis) that could be implemented in the study of intelligence. Spearman (1904) 
provided a way to determine the amount of saturation a variable had with g. In essence, 
the saturations described by Spearman were factor loadings derived from simple 
formulae (Carroll, 1993; Drasgow, 2003). The importance of factor analysis’ introduction 
in the study of intelligence cannot be overstated. Indeed, Reeve and Bonaccio (2011) 
recognized its importance saying, “the use of factor analysis in the study of cognitive 
abilities is in many ways equivalent to the use of the telescope in the study of astrological 
bodies” (p. 192). Yet, the use of factor analysis in research is not without controversy and 
debate (Osbome & Fitzpatrick, 2012). For instance, debate remains over the best 
extraction techniques, when certain rotation techniques are appropriate, the decision rule 
regarding the number of factors one should extract and interpret, how large a sample size 
one needs, and the generalizability of the results (e.g., Costello & Osbome, 2005; Henson 
& Roberts, 2006; MacCallum, Widaman, Preacher, & Hong, 2001). Hence, factor 
analysis is more of an art than a precise science. Moreover, unlike factor analysis, the 
telescope in astronomy is likely not surrounded by such controversy and debate; thus, the 
comparison is imperfect.
Louis Thurstone made further methodological contributions through his study of 
intelligence. Similar to Spearman, Thurstone (1938) believed that intelligence consisted 
of an organized structure that could be shown through statistical analysis of ability tests. 
That is, he assumed the patterns among different ability tests would provide evidence of a
14
systematic structure of intelligence. However, unlike Spearman, Thurstone proposed a 
multifactor model of intelligence that explicitly rejected a unitary notion of intelligence 
(i.e., g). To investigate his model, he administered 56 tests to 218 University of Chicago 
students. Thurstone (1947) developed multiple factor analysis to analyze the data and 
found, after extracting and rotating, seven mental abilities (i.e., perceptual, memory, 
inductive reasoning, numerical, verbal relations, spatial, word fluency) that he believed 
contributed to intelligence (Thurstone, 1938). However, Spearman (1927, 1939) critiqued 
Thurstone’s model noting that the factor analysis technique used did not allow for g  to be 
inferred, if  indeed it existed. As such, Spearman re-analyzed Thurstone’s data using a 
statistical technique that allowed, but did not require, the extraction of g  (Spearman, 
1939). The re-analysis results showed that g, in addition Thurstone’s seven mental 
abilities, could be obtained. Later, Thurstone (1947) acknowledged that the seven mental 
abilities were correlated and the extraction of g  was conceivable.
Despite the differences between Thurstone and Spearman, their models of 
intelligence were not fundamentally different (Carroll, 1993). Both allowed for g  and 
more specific factors to exist. In essence, the difference was primarily whether one 
placed greater emphasis on g  or the more specific factors. Other psychometric 
representations of intelligence were later developed. For example, Vernon (1950) 
developed a hierarchical model in which g  influenced the lower levels of intelligence. 
Two primary factors (i.e., verbal-education and spatial-mechanical) were positioned at 
the next level below g. Each of the two primary factors were minor factors consisting of 
specific skills. Though Vemon (1961) considered g  to largely account for individual 
differences within a domain, differences in specific skills would also likely contribute. In
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contrast to a hierarchical model, Guilford (1967) proposed the Structure of Intellect (SOI) 
model, which suggested that the abilities contained in the model were independent of one 
another or uncorrelated. Hence, the model excluded g. However, the SOI model has been 
criticized for being illogical in nature and inconsistent with empirical findings (Carroll, 
1993; Reeve & Bonaccio, 2011).
The psychometric models of intelligence presented do not represent an exhaustive 
list, but the models help illustrate the similarities, despite some differences on the surface. 
As Carroll (1993) noted, “all of them assume an organization of abilities whereby some 
abilities are more general than others” and the different number of abilities recognized by 
the models depended to some degree on “the factorial methods available to, or favored 
by, the authors of these models” (p. 62). Moreover, the psychometric representation of 
abilities is important to understanding the structure of intelligence, but as Kelley (1939) 
stated, “evidence of existence of a factor... [should not be] cited as evidence that it is 
important” (p. 141). Despite Kelley’s comment, much of the psychometric study of 
intelligence has “focused on the statistical properties of standardized performance test, 
producing a lack of theoretical knowledge on the nature of the processes underlying 
individual differences in intelligence” (Chamorro-Premuzic & Fumham, 2005, p. 29). 
Current State of 1-0 Intelligence Research
Meta-analytic evidence and arguments presented in Schmidt and Hunter (1998,
2004) appear to have persuaded the field of 1-0 psychology o f g’s importance in staffing 
organizations (Reeve et al., 2015; Schneider & Newman, 2015). Indeed, g is often 
credited as being the best single predictor of performance on the job, generally producing 
a medium effect size (Cohen, 1992). As such, measuring specific cognitive abilities for
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personnel selection has been considered not worth the time (Hunter, 1986; Ree, Earles, & 
Teachout, 1994) and specific cognitive abilities (e.g., quantitative reasoning; visual- 
spatial ability) have often only produced a small (according to Cohen, 1992) amount of 
additional predictive power over g (Reeve et al., 2015). Spearman’s (1927) “indifference 
of the indicator” principle seemed to provide further justification for 1-0 psychology’s 
focus on measuring g (Ree & Carretta, 2002). Jensen (1992) summarized Spearman’s 
principle saying, “all cognitive tests are vehicles of g...and it has proved impossible to 
devise a mental ability test that is not g loaded to some degree” (p. 275). Thus, regardless 
of the measure of intelligence used (e.g., a specific cognitive ability measure), the results 
obtained reflect, to some extent, a measurement of g (not entirely the intended specific 
cognitive ability).
Whether due to the aforementioned measurement issues or one or more other 
factors, the field of 1-0 psychology has essentially embraced a unitary view of 
intelligence that stems from a psychometric view of deriving the structure of intelligence, 
mathematically, from the shared commonality among a battery of intelligence tests; an 
embracement that has hindered conversation and debate about other approaches to 
intelligence (Scherbaum et al., 2012). That being said, the embracement of a 
psychometric approach was not unjustified or without research support. In terms of 
usefulness, g  has been incredibly successful at predicting job performance and other 
human behaviors in the workplace (Murphy, 1996). The success led some (e.g., Ree & 
Earles, 1991) to claim that there is “not much more than g.” As such, this has prompted 
many in 1-0 psychology to conclude that intelligence theories do not offer much more
17
beyond the field’s current knowledge and that specific cognitive abilities, compared to g, 
provide little value in the prediction of job performance (Reeve et al., 2015).
Despite g ’s success in 1-0 psychology, measures of g  have not continued to 
improve the prediction of job performance. In particular, Ackerman and Beier (2012) 
noted, “traditional measures of g  have reached a plateau in terms of predictive validity for 
job-relevant criteria” (p. 150). That being said, it is important to note that g  is not the only 
determinate of performance on the job (e.g., motivation, personality; Gatewood et al., 
2007). However, with regard to using measures o f g, one potential limitation to continued 
improvement of job performance prediction is a lack of theoretical consideration to 
lifespan cognitive development in g  theories (van der Maas et al., 2006). 1-0 psychology 
has appeared to adopt Spearman’s notion of intelligence being innate and fixed 
(Ackerman & Beier, 2012). Other intelligence theorists (e.g., R. B. Cattell, 1987) have 
argued for and incorporated developmental changes in intelligence, such as the idea that 
increases in overall knowledge can result from occupational and educational experiences. 
Indeed, longitudinal evidence suggests that adult intelligence scores remain fairly stable 
over the short term, but gains and losses in mental ability have been observed over the 
long term (Schaie, 1996). Yet, the use o f a unitary-factor g  model in 1-0 psychology is 
inadequate to explain both the pattern of growth and decline in ability observed in 
longitudinal studies (Finkel, Reynolds, McArdle, & Pedersen, 2007; McArdle, Ferrer- 
Caja, Hamagami, & Woodcock, 2002; McArdle, Hamagami, Meredith, & Bradway, 
2000). That is, all intellectual abilities are considered a linear function of g  and as g  
increases, the abilities should increase in proportion to their relationship with g  (Nisbett 
et al., 2012). However, intellectual abilities differ in their developmental trajectories (e.g.,
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some abilities begin to decline in early adulthood, others decline in old age), and as such, 
g  “yields an overly simplistic view of growth and change over age” (McArdle et al.,
2002, p. 115).
Unless 1-0 psychology takes into account ability development over time, the field 
is “likely to remain stuck in a rut” (Ackerman & Beier, 2012, p. 151) with regard to using 
intelligence to understand and predict behavior at work. Granted, a long-term view of 
intelligence may not appeal to organizations and researchers merely concerned with 
short-term outcomes (e.g., job performance) due to employees frequently changing jobs; 
however, it stands to reason that numerous employees remain with a sole organization for 
longer periods of time (e.g., several years; Ackerman & Beier, 2012). Despite some 
employees experiencing long job tenure, 1-0 psychology has largely failed at 
incorporating research findings and exploring theoretical notions from different 
intelligence approaches that would attempt to provide answers to such developmental 
issues (e.g., reasoning ability decline) likely to affect employees over time (Ackerman & 
Beier, 2012; Reeve et al., 2015; Schaie, 1996; Scherbaum et al., 2012). Consequently, I- 
O psychology has lagged further behind in the pioneering research and knowledge on 
intelligence (Scherbaum et al., 2012).
However, 1-0 psychology’s embracement of other intelligence approaches could 
improve real-world objectives (e.g., enhanced job performance prediction, develop 
intelligence measures with lower adverse impact) and galvanize the field’s stagnated 
research agenda for intelligence (Agnello et al., 2015; Reeve et al., 2015). One such 
approach, known collectively as the intellectual investment theories (Ackerman, 1996; R. 
B. Cattell, 1943; von Stumm & Ackerman, 2013), holds promise for 1-0 psychology
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intelligence research (e.g., accounting for change in ability over time, incorporating 
personality traits thought to influence cognitive development); a review of its origins and 
development is beneficial to understand its application to the workplace.
Historical Origins of Intellectual Investment
Raymond Cattell proposed a model that divided intelligence into two basic forms; 
namely, fluid and crystallized intelligence (R. B. Cattell, 1943), commonly denoted as Gf 
and Gc, respectively (Drasgow, 2003). The model stemmed from a developmental view 
of intelligence and “has evolved into one of the most influential psychometric models of 
intelligence” (Reeve & Bonaccio, 2011, p. 195). The development of his Gf-Gc model 
was the result of a number of influences (R. B. Cattell, 1971,1987). Among these 
influences, R. B. Cattell (1971,1987), a student of Charles Spearman, noted that the 
perceptual or cultural-free intelligence tests (spatial, non-verbal) used in Spearman’s 
laboratory clustered together (particularly when applied to children) and were distinct 
from the education-oriented intelligence tests, which suggested that such tests comprised 
a different facet of g. Likewise, perceptual tests and education-oriented g  tests showed 
different age-related changes (e.g., steady performance declines on perceptual tests began 
at earlier ages than did declines on education-oriented tests). In addition, the evidence 
from Thurstone’s (1938) multifactor model seemed to indicate more than a single factor 
of intelligence. Another influence stemmed from R. B. Cattell’s experience creating 
culture independent intelligence measures, which according to Carroll (1984), 
“undoubtedly” contributed to the creation of his fluid and crystallized theory of 
intelligence.
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Carroll (1984) noted that through the span of approximately 20 years (1930s- 
1950s), R. B. Cattell devoted much attention to intelligence testing and development. In 
particular, R. B. Cattell placed importance on the creation o f measures that assessed 
intelligence in a manner that was not culturally dependent. That is, test content 
representative o f universal knowledge, not culturally based knowledge. Indeed, R. B. 
Cattell contended that many of the available intelligence tests were largely based on 
culturally acquired knowledge (Cattell & Bristol, 1933). Moreover, R. B. Cattell believed 
it was possible to design an intelligence measure for individuals originating from diverse 
cultures, the content of which contained largely universal knowledge (R. B. Cattell,
1940). To R. B. Cattell (1940), these cultural-free, common knowledge test items could 
assess intellectual reasoning and as a consequence culture group comparisons could be 
made.
In 1940, R. B. Cattell designed a test that contained visual content he believed 
was not culturally dependent. The visual items, based on other developed intelligence 
tests (e.g., The Spearman Visual Perception Test), included mazes, image series, 
classification (i.e., identifying the unrelated item(s) among a group of items), sequence 
and relation matrices, and mirror images. Although the words fluid and crystallized were 
not in the culture-free test papers (Carroll, 1984; R. B. Cattell, 1940; Cattell, Feingold, & 
Sarason, 1941), the spatial, non-verbal items used in the culture-free intelligence test 
closely resemble the content contained in what R. B. Cattell and others (e.g., R. B.
Cattell, 1971,1987; Horn & Cattell, 1967) later deemed Gf measures (e.g., Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices). Likewise, the culture-free test displayed age-related relationships 
similar to those later observed on tests of fluid ability (e.g., stronger performance earlier
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in development; R. B. Cattell, 1971,1987; Horn & Cattell, 1967). Indeed, Cattell and 
colleagues (1941) compared the culture-free test with other popular intelligence tests 
during the time such as The Terman-Merrill revision of the Binet and the Arthur 
Performance Test. The results of the study showed that children performed better on the 
culture-free test than did highly cultured adults, a finding that is consistent with age- 
related differences in Gf. Thus, R. B. Cattell’s work on the culture-free intelligence test 
along with other influences (e.g., findings from Spearman’s laboratory) impacted the 
development of his Gf-Gc theory (Carroll, 1984; R. B. Cattell, 1971,1987).
In R. B. CattelTs (1943) “The Measurement o f  Adult Intelligence,” he proposed 
several ideas that would form the basis of his Gf-Gc model of intelligence. According to 
R. B. Cattell (1943), Gf “has the character of a purely general ability to discriminate and 
perceive relations between any fundaments, new or old... [and] increases until 
adolescence and then slowly declines” (p. 178). In contrast, Gc “consists of 
discriminatory habits established in a particular field, originally through the operation of 
fluid ability, but not longer requiring insightful perceptions for their successful operation” 
(p. 178). In addition, he detailed the psychometric properties of intelligence tests noting 
such tests measure a combination of both Gf and Gc at every age, but Gf largely 
determines test performance in childhood, whereas Gc determines more of the test 
performance in adulthood.
R. B. Cattell’s (1943) model of intelligence was posited “almost simultaneously” 
with Hebb’s (1941,1942) ideas of human intelligence (Ackerman, 2013). A 
neuropsychologist, Hebb (1939) studied individuals with brain injuries using intelligence 
tests to assess overall general intellectual functioning as well as verbal and non-verbal
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skills. He examined a series of intelligence test results from individuals with damaged or 
removed brain tissue. Hebb (1941,1942) noticed that brain injuries affected individuals 
differently at various stages of human development. In particular, individuals with brain 
injuries sustained in early development (infancy) tended to display lower overall general 
intelligence scores and verbal ability in later stages of development. In contrast, 
individuals with brain trauma occurring in middle or late development (adulthood) 
showed minimal to zero decline in overall general intelligence or verbal ability. These 
findings suggested to him that adult intelligence consisted of two distinct aspects; 
namely, Intelligence A and Intelligence B (Hebb, 1942). According to Hebb (1942), 
intellectual development involved “(A) the development of direct intellectual 
power.. .and (B) the establishment of routine modes of response to common problems”
(p. 289).
R. B. Cattell (1943) noted the similarities between his Gf-Gc theory and Hebb’s 
Intelligence-A and Intelligence-B ideas saying, “Hebb has independently stated very 
clearly what constitutes two thirds of the present theory” (p. 179). In addition, several 
others scholars (e.g., Ackerman, 1996; Carroll, 1984) have also noted the similarities. For 
example, R. B. Cattell conceived of Gf as relating to abstract reasoning, learning novel 
material, and general engagement of higher-order mental operations and processes (e.g., 
inductive reasoning; Ackerman, 2013; Drasgow, 2003). Likewise, Hebb’s Intelligence A 
involved similar processes as Gf (e.g., abstract reasoning, solving new problems; 
Ackerman, 2013). Moreover, both Gf and Intelligence A were thought to peak early in 
individual development and decline with increasing age (R. B. Cattell, 1943; Hebb,
1942). Gc, on the other hand, was considered to be representative of an individual’s
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diverse range of knowledge and skills (e.g., language, general information) acquired 
through experience and education (Ackerman, 2013; R. B. Cattell, 1943; Drasgow,
2003). Similarly, Intelligence B encompassed the same aspects as Gc (e.g., knowledge 
and skills an individual acquires over time; Ackerman, 2013; Hebb, 1942). Furthermore, 
Gc and Intelligence B were believed to be well maintained over one’s lifespan 
(Ackerman, 2013). Although the Hebb and R. B. Cattell’s theories of intelligence were 
similar, Hebb did not continue to develop his theory much in the ensuing years, while R. 
B. Cattell continued to refine and expand his Gf-Gc theory in the subsequent years 
(Ackerman, 2013).
Gf-Gc Theory and G
In his first empirical study of Gf-Gc theory, R. B. Cattell (1963) administered 
several ability measures from the Culture Fair Intelligence Test (e.g., matrices, 
classification) and Thurstone Primary Mental Abilities Tests (e.g., verbal, spatial, 
reasoning) to 7th and 8th grade students. R. B. Cattell observed some ability measures 
such as verbal and reasoning were highly related to one factor (Gc), while scores on other 
measures such as matrices, spatial, and classification were highly related to a different 
factor (Gf). Thus, he found support for “the existence of two general ability factors” (p. 
20). In addition, John Horn, a student of Raymond Cattell, empirically tested Gf-Gc 
theory and introduced refinements to the theory with Cattell (e.g., Horn, 1965,1968;
Horn & Cattell, 1966,1967). Indeed, Horn (1965) and Horn and Cattell (1967) found 
age-related changes support for Gf-Gc theory. That is, the authors observed a decline in 
Gf and an increase in Gc with age. The reader may note that age-related changes Horn 
and Cattell (1967) observed question the differentiation-by-age assumption of Binet and
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Simon. Through empirical investigations, Horn (1965) found additional factors to Gf and 
Gc (e.g., Gv or visualization) and later, other identified ability factors and refinements 
were added to Gf-Gc theory (e.g., Horn, 1968; Horn & Cattell, 1967). In essence, the 
Hom-Cattell model was a hierarchical model that did not concede a higher-order g-factor 
as the only explanation for the positive manifold between second-order (e.g., Gf, Gc, Gv) 
factors (Carroll, 1993; Horn, 1968; Reeve & Bonaccio, 2011). That is, positive manifold 
permits the influence of only g, but equally allows for many influences only loosely 
associated (Horn, 1968).
Horn and Cattell (1966) noted that Gf-Gc theory “seriously questions the notion 
that there is a unitary structure which can be designated general intelligence” (p. 253). 
Likewise, Schneider and Newman (2015) argued that intelligence is not unidimensional 
due to a large amount of empirical evidence suggesting multidimensional and 
hierarchical models accounting for different factors of intelligence (e.g., Gf, Gc, verbal 
ability, spatial ability) provide better fit than do unidimensional models (though 
unidimensional models o f intelligence do not result in horrible fit). Providing support for 
this notion, Carroll (1993) conducted one of the most comprehensive examinations of the 
psychometric structure of intelligence. He reanalyzed 461 data sets from previous factor- 
analytic studies of intelligence. From his reanalysis, a three-stratum structure of 
intelligence was identified (Figure 1), with a general mental ability factor (g) in the third 
stratum that accounted for the most variance. Moreover, in the second stratum, Gf and Gc 
were most strongly related to g. The first stratum contains narrow abilities that represent 
each second stratum factor. The results were highly consistence with Gf-Gc theory and as 
such, McGrew (1997,2005,2009) proposed a conceptual unification known as the
25
Carroll-Hom-Cattell (CHC) model of intelligence. Despite the common framework 
(CHC), differences between the theories remained.
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speedGf GcStrstum II memory
Stratum I (not shown)
Figure 1 Carroll’s Three-stratum Model o f  Intelligence.
Adapted from Handbook o f Psychology. Industrial and Organizational Psychology (p. 115), by F. Drasgow, 2003, 
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons. Copyright 2003 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Schneider and Newman (2015) argued that the main difference between the two 
theories is g  being at the top of Carroll’s (1993) hierarchical theory, whereas Horn 
favored (e.g., Horn & Blankson, 2005) a hierarchical model that included the broad 
correlated factors in the second stratum, explicitly objecting to a g-factor. R. B. Cattell 
(1963) did not entirely object to a g-factor, but his interpretation slightly differed from 
others (e.g., Spearman). R. B. Cattell (1963) summarized his initial empirical study of Gf 
and Gc stating, “these two general abilities appear in a single third-order factor 
hypothesized to express the "formative fluid ability" partly responsible for the present 
level of both of them” (p. 20). That is, previous fluid ability or “historical fluid 
intelligence” in stratum three (as opposed to g) caused the Gf and Gc in present day 
(Figure 2; R. B. Cattell, 1971, 1987). Indeed, Carroll’s (1993) results found both Gf and 
Gc to be most strongly related to his g-factor, which supports R. B. Cattell’s (1963) 
notion of what the general factor represented and caused. As such, empirical evidence
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supports Gf-Gc theory as a psychometric representation of intelligence as well as its 
lifespan cognitive developmental hypotheses (e.g., Gf declines in early development, Gc 
increases with age). Hence, Gf-Gc theory better integrates the psychometric and 
developmental perspectives of intelligence than sole ^-theories (Reeve & Bonaccio, 
2011).
Historical
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Present
GcPresentGfStratum II
Figure 2 Cattell’s Investment Theory
Adapted from Intelligence: Its Structure, Growth, and Action (p. 146), by R. B. Cattell, 1987, New York, NY: Elsevier 
Science. Copyright 2003 by Elsevier Science Publishers.
Development of Intellectual Investment Theories
Despite Gf-Gc theory better integrating the psychometric and developmental 
perspectives of intelligence, the developmental aspects have not been extensively 
investigated. Indeed, numerous empirical investigations have been conducted on the 
psychometric structure of Gf-Gc theory, but less recognized and researched is the 
developmental aspect of Gf-Gc theory known as Investment Theory (Figure 2; 
Ackerman, 1996; R. B. Cattell, 1971,1987; Thorsen, Gustafsson, & Cliffordson, 2014). 
The basic ideas of R. B. Cattell’s (1971,1987) Investment Theory were evident in the 
early development of Gf-Gc theory, though he did not explicitly reference Investment
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Theory in these early works (e.g., R. B. Cattell, 1943). When describing Gc, R. B. Cattell 
(1943) stated it “consists of discriminatory habits long established in a particular field, 
originally through the operation of fluid ability” (p. 178). That is, the investment of fluid 
ability over time causes, to a large degree, the development of Gc (R. B. Cattell, 1963, 
1971,1987). Moreover, a reciprocal causal relationship between Gf and Gc is not 
maintained in the theory (Schmidt & Crano, 1974). In other words, one’s current level of 
Gf is thought to be independent or unaffected by one’s previous accumulated Gc. In 
addition, other factors like personality and motivation were thought to affect (to a lesser 
degree) the investment of Gf into Gc. Indeed, R. B. Cattell (1963) speculated that further 
investigation into Gf-Gc theory may uncover “a number of personality and dynamic 
factors (e.g., super ego [sic] strength, emotional stability) affecting the investment of 
fluid intelligence in crystallized intelligence skills” (p. 10).
The most extensive discussion of Investment Theory was first presented in R. B. 
Cattell’s (1971) Abilities: Their structure, growth, and action and later in R. B. Cattell’s 
(1987) Intelligence: Its structure, growth, and action. An extension of the psychometric 
structure of Gf-Gc theory, Investment Theory proposed a causal relationship between Gf 
and Gc and as such, implies that individual differences observed in Gc are contingent on 
levels o f Gf. To R. B. Cattell (1987), Gf is considered “a single, general, relation- 
perceiving ability... .applicable to any sensory or motor area” (p. 138). The term “fluid” is 
used since it is not restrained to any sensory or motor area or tied to particular habits (R. 
B. Cattell, 1987). The rate at which one learns tasks, especially complex tasks (e.g., 
reading, mathematics, abstract reasoning), is largely dependent on Gf levels (though other 
factors such as quality o f teaching and individual motivation will affect learning).
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Stemming from the learning process (e.g., experience, practice), these acquired abilities 
such as knowledge and “high-level judgment skills” result in Gc “because their 
expression is tied to a series of particular areas” (R. B. Cattell, 1987, p. 139). That is, 
unlike Gf, Gc is constrained to particular habits or certain areas (e.g., sensory, motor). 
Though R. B. Cattell (1987) believed the investment of Gf largely accounted for acquired 
Gc, he acknowledged that “years at school, interest in school work, and other influences 
[would] also determine, perhaps substantially, the level of crystallized abilities” (p. 139).
As previously discussed, R. B. Cattell interpreted the third-order g-factor (high 
correlations among broad abilities or positive manifold) as representing historical Gf (R. 
B. Cattell, 1971,1987). Hence, a positive relationship between one’s performances on 
two distinct Gc assessments (e.g., vocabulary, general knowledge) is largely accounted 
by historical Gf. Moreover, one’s present-day Gc level “is a function of last year’s fluid 
ability level - and last year’s interest in school work and abstract problems generally” (R. 
B. Cattell, 1987, p. 139). Thus, one hypothesis that stems from Investment Theory is the 
idea that present-day Gc level is a partly due to previous levels of both Gf and Gc 
(Thorsen et al., 2014). Another hypothesis that follows is previous Gc levels should not 
affect one’s current Gf levels. These propositions of Investment Theory have been 
examined empirically (e.g., Ferrer & McArdle, 2004; Gustafsson & Undheim, 1992; 
McArdle et al., 2000; Rindermann, Flores-Mendoza, & Mansur-Alves, 2010; Schmidt & 
Crano, 1974; Thorsen et al., 2014), but the results have varied; some found support, while 
other findings were inconclusive. In short, R. B. Cattell’s Investment Theory remains 
more of a theoretical explanation of cognitive development than a robust, empirically- 
supported phenomenon.
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Motivational-Experiential Theory of Intelligence
Similar to R. B. Cattell’s cognitive development ideas, Hayes (1962) proposed a 
motivational-experiential theory to help explain intellectual differences that occur among 
individuals over time. According to Hayes (1962, p. 303), the theory involved four main 
points:
(a) Differences in motivation may be genetically determined, (b) These 
motivational differences, along with differences in environment, cause differences 
in experience, (c) Differences in experience lead to differences in ability, (d) The 
differences commonly referred to as intellectual are nothing more than differences 
in acquired abilities.
The theory implies that differences in motivation affect cognitive development in so 
much as it drives an individual to pursue learning activities and intellectual-stimulating 
environments. Hence, initial motivational levels, to a large degree, account for life-span 
differences in cognitive ability.
Hayes’ definition of intelligence closely resembled that of Gc. As he described, 
“manifest intelligence is nothing more than an accumulation of learned facts and skills” 
(Hayes, 1962, p. 337). The accumulation of knowledge and abilities in Hayes’ (1962) 
theory suggests that the investment of motivation (as opposed to Gf) contributes to 
observed differences in intelligence. Like R. B. Cattell’s ideas on the heritability of Gf, 
Hayes believed variations in initial motivation levels were largely innate; but he rejected 
the notion of an inborn general factor of intelligence. Thus, the primary difference 
between the two theoretical approaches was on the existence of an inherited cognitive- 
ability capacity and its impact on intellectual development.
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R. B. Cattell (1971, 1987) acknowledged that motivation and interest in school
played a part in his Investment Theory, but Gf (an innate intellectual capacity) was
primarily responsible for the trajectory and capability of one’s overall cognitive
development. In contrast, Hayes (1962) argued against a predetermined intellectual
capacity influence. Instead, he assumed that motivation levels directed individuals
towards (and away from) particular learning activities, which in turn, lead to different
intellectual capabilities over time. That is, all individuals are bom with the ability to
achieve any level of cognitive ability (through learning experiences), but innate
motivation levels to pursue intellectually-engaging opportunities largely accounts for
observed differences in ability. Building on the ideas of both R. B. Cattell and Hayes,
Ackerman (1996) proposed an investment theory of cognitive development that considers
the collected influence of different human aspects (e.g., personality, interests) in the
development of intelligence.
Intelligence-as-Process, Personality, Interests, and 
Intelligence-as-Knowledge Theory
Ackerman (1996) proposed an integrated intellectual investment theory known as 
intelligence-as-process, personality, interests, and intelligence-as knowledge (PPIK). 
Based largely, but not exclusively (e.g., Hayes, 1962; Hebb, 1942), on R. B. Cattell’s 
(1971, 1987) Investment Theory, PPIK suggests a causal relationship from intelligence- 
as-process to intelligence-as-knowledge. Intelligence-as-process reflects fluid-type 
abilities (physiological-based), whereas intelligence-as-knowledge reflects crystallized- 
type abilities (experience- and educational-based; Ackerman, 2000). Like R. B. Cattell, 
Ackerman (1996) believed individual differences in intelligence-as-knowledge were 
partly due to ability (intelligence-as-process), but personality traits and interests were also
believed to determine the differences to the extent to which they influenced intellectual 
investment of said ability. Moreover, Ackerman (1996) posited that abilities and interests 
develop together, such that ability level determines the likelihood of success on a 
particular task, and the motivation to engage in a task stems from both interests and 
personality. Successful performance on tasks increases interest in the task domain and 
subsequently, an individual’s task- and domain-specific knowledge increases. 
Unsuccessful task performance, however, decreases interests and likely hinders any 
future development of domain-specific knowledge.
Intelligence-as-knowledge and Gc are similar in nature (Ackerman, 1996). 
Intelligence-as-knowledge is believed to form the basis of adult intelligence and contain 
the domain-specific knowledge of adult intellect (Ackerman, 2000). According to 
Ackerman (2000), domain-specific knowledge includes acquired information about 
occupations, academic studies (e.g., medicine, law), hobbies, functioning of a 
government, etc. As such, domain-specific knowledge in the PPIK model develops in a 
similar manner as Gc in that both accumulate over time. However, commonly used 
assessments of Gc typically do not measure the broad construct of adult intellect 
(Ackerman, 1996,2000). Gc tests are generally designed to measure acquired experience 
knowledge (Carroll, 1993). For instance, these tests usually measure consensus or 
culturally-acquired knowledge such as language abilities (e.g., vocabulary, understanding 
synonyms, spelling), not domain-specific knowledge (e.g., job- or occupation-specific 
knowledge; Ackerman, 1996; Carroll, 1993). Given the numerous aspects of intelligence- 
as-knowledge, Ackerman (2000) acknowledged the difficulties in adequately measuring 
its full breadth and depth. That being said, von Stumm and Ackerman (2013) noted that
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Gc assessments are considered markers or proxies of intelligence-as-knowledge, and by 
extension adult intellect, because such measures typically assess intelligence built and 
developed over time. As mentioned before, this development of adult intellect is thought 
to be guided, in part, by personality traits; so-called intellectual investment traits 
(Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Ackerman & Rolfhus, 1999; Goff & Ackerman, 1992). 
As such, understanding the associations between personality and intellect is useful in 
better understanding the intellectual-investment-theories framework and in particular, the 
reason investment traits have been hypothesized to contribute to the development of 
cognitive ability.
Investment Trait: Openness to Experience
Intellectual investment traits are defined as “stable individual differences in the 
tendency to seek out, engage in, enjoy, and continuously pursue opportunities for 
effortful cognitive activity” (von Stumm, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Ackerman, 2011, p. 
225). Investment traits, on the one hand, are believed to help explain individual 
differences in the pursuit of learning activities, such as going to galleries and museums, 
solving puzzles and riddles, and reading newspapers (Soubelet & Salthouse, 2010; von 
Stumm & Ackerman, 2013). On the other hand, investment traits may help individuals 
construct experiences (e.g., exotic, mundane) in an intellectual stimulating way that 
promotes cognitive growth and development (Kashdan, Rose, & Fincham, 2004; Stine- 
Morrow, 2007). Ackerman’s (1996) intellectual investment traits and Hayes’s (1962) 
motivational drives refer to the same tendency; namely, an overall learning orientation 
(i.e., hunger for knowledge; von Stumm & Ackerman, 2013). However, Hayes believed 
that learning orientation was the sole source for individual differences in cognitive
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ability, whereas Ackerman allowed for reciprocal effects between intelligence-as-process, 
intellectual investment traits, and interests, to account for differences in intelligence-as- 
knowledge. While all investment theories agree that intelligence is a continuing process 
that develops into adult intellect, the mechanisms (e.g., intellectual investment traits) 
underlying the development are not fully known. That is, it is also possible that higher 
intelligence levels enable individuals to pursue learning opportunities (i.e., ability 
precedes the development of intellectual investment traits) or that greater acquired 
knowledge produces hunger for additional knowledge (i.e., prompting learning 
engagement), but von Stumm and Ackeramn (2013) argued that adult cognitive 
development is most plausibly due to a mutual development and shared reciprocal 
influence between intellectual investment traits and intelligence.
An abundance of investment traits have been identified (see von Stumm & 
Ackerman, 2013 for a review), but the most frequently used proxy for investment traits is 
Openness to Experience, a personality trait within the Five Factor Model (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992) and a vital part of Ackerman’s (1996) PPIK model. The trait Openness to 
Experience describes individuals being intellectual curious, imaginative, pursuing 
variety, exploring their emotions and inner feelings, holding unconventional values, and 
having aesthetic appreciation (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Individuals with these particular 
characteristics arguably spend more time learning new information and attempting to 
solve novel problems (Ziegler, Danay, Heene, Asendorpf, & Buhner, 2012). Moreover, 
individuals high on Openness to Experience prefer and are more likely to encounter new, 
intellectually-stimulating situations, which involves encountering new information and 
enjoying numerous learning experiences (von Stumm et al., 2011; Ziegler et al., 2012).
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As such, these activities plausibly lead to further development and strengthening of 
knowledge and Gc (Chamorro-Premuzic & Fumham, 2005; von Stumm et al., 2011).
A positive relationship between Openness to Experience and general intelligence 
has been shown consistently (e.g., Judge, Jackson, Shaw, Scott, & Rich, 2007; Woo, 
Chernyshenko, Stark, & Conz, 2014). However, Ackerman and Heggestad (1997) found 
that Openness to Experience was more strongly related to Gc than Gf. Likewise, von 
Stumm (2013) found that Openness to Experience had a stronger association with 
intelligence-as-knowledge than with intelligence-as-process, and after adjusting for 
intelligence-as-process, Openness to Experience’s relationship with intelligence-as- 
knowledge reduced, but remained significant. Moreover, von Stumm and Ackerman 
(2013) found that five o f the six facets of Openness to Experience (the exception being 
Actions) were positively related to Gc. Providing longitudinal support for the theory, 
Ziegler et al. (2012) found that Openness to Experience positively affected cognitive- 
development changes. Moreover, the authors found support for the interplay between 
Openness to Experience and Gf on the development of Gc, thus providing support for 
Openness to Experience as an intellectual investment trait and the investment theories of 
cognitive development.
Adult Development of Gc
Although a number of longitudinal studies have demonstrated that individual 
differences in cognitive ability remains fairly stable over time (e.g., Conley, 1984; Deary, 
2000,2001; Deary, Whalley, Lemon, Crawford, & Starr, 2000), a pattern of within- 
person variability generally emerges. That is, cognitive ability is much more stable over 
the short term, than over the long term. To provide some clarification for this
phenomenon, let us return to the empirical evidence on age-related changes in Gf and Gc. 
In 1966, Horn and Cattell argued that the mixed results (e.g., some finding intelligence 
increased, decreased, and/or remained fairly constant with age) observed in previous 
studies on age-related changes in intelligence could be explained by the degree to which 
the researchers measured various levels of Gf and Gc. To this end, Horn and Cattell 
(1966, 1967) demonstrated that Gf negatively correlated with age, while Gc positively 
correlated with age. The initial findings from Horn and Cattell have largely been 
consistent with subsequent empirical studies on age-related changes in intelligence (see 
Schaie, 1996 for a review).
Gc, in contrast to Gf, has been found to increase throughout much of one’s 
lifespan (e.g., Horn & Cattell, 1967; Kaufman, Johnson, & Liu, 2008; Schaie, 1996). 
Indeed, Gc has been estimated to continue to increase until around the age of 70, an age 
that most working adults are retired by in the United States, and then slowly decreases 
afterwards (e.g., Schaie, 1996). Moreover, adult peak performance on crystallized-type 
ability tests has been shown to occur later in age (e.g., late 30s), and then present a 
plateau or a gradual decline pattern (Ackerman, 2013). Likewise, middle-aged adults 
have been found to be more knowledgeable in many domain-specific areas compared to 
younger adults (Ackerman, 2000). Given the cumulative evidence demonstrating minimal 
decline over time, Gc has been referred to as a maintained ability (e.g., Horn & Blankson,
2005). Thus, on average, adults should display higher levels of Gc compared to their 
younger counterparts (Ackerman, 2013). That being said, what are the implications of 
accumulated Gc in an organizational context? Moreover, what role does Openness to 
Experience, an investment trait, play? Do they both contribute to job performance? To
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this end, exploring the Gc- and Openness to Experience-job performance relationships 
will help illuminate the applicability of the intellectual investment framework within an 
organizational setting.
Intellectual Investment Theories and Job Performance
Theoretical linkages between individual-difference predictors (e.g., intelligence, 
personality) and outcomes (e.g., job performance) play an important role in 
understanding work behaviors (Ones et al., 2012). Before detailing the conceptual and 
theoretical links of the Gc- and Openness to Experience-job performance relationship, job 
performance must be described. Job performance has been defined as observable 
behaviors individuals engage in that contribute both directly and indirectly to the goals of 
the organization (Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 1993). Moreover, job 
performance is generally considered multidimensional in nature (e.g., Campbell, 
McHenry, & Wise, 1990; Ghiselli, 1956), although the commonalities among 
performance measures suggest a higher-order, general factor of job performance 
(Viswesvaran & Ones, 2000; Viswesvaran, Schmidt, & Ones, 2005). As such, the 
following discussion will focus on overall job performance.
Gc and Job Performance
Conceptually, intelligence tests are related to job performance because, to a large 
extent, they assess an individual’s ability for learning (Ones et al., 2012). This idea of 
one’s learning ability is often contained in various definitions of intelligence. Indeed, the 
definition of Gc reflects the effectiveness to which an individual has previously learned 
(Postlethwaite, 2011). Empirically, strong links have been made between one’s ability to 
learn and acquire knowledge and skills (as measured by intelligence tests), and the
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demonstration of actual learned skills and acquired knowledge across a variety of 
domains (e.g., academic, occupational; Kuncel, Hezlett, & Ones, 2004; Ones et al.,
2012). Not surprisingly, Gc has been shown to be related to job performance 
(Postlethwaite, 2011). In fact, Postlethwaite (2011) found that crystallized ability was 
more strongly related to job performance than fluid ability. Several reasons help explain 
why crystallized ability is a robust predictor of job performance; namely, past 
performance, human aging, and the nature of work.
As previously discussed, Gc reflects previously learned knowledge. As such, 
measures of Gc capture an individual’s past performance with respects to learning 
(Postlethwaite, 2011). This is in line with one of the most well established phenomena in 
Psychology. That is, one of the best predictors of future performance is past performance 
(e.g., Locke, Frederick, Lee, & Bobko, 1984; Oullette & Wood, 1998). For instance, 
undergraduate GPA was found to be related to desirable graduate school outcomes (e.g., 
overall GPA, performance on comprehensive exams; Kuncel, Hezlett, & Ones, 2001). 
Moreover, Gc measures assess both ability and other factors (e.g., motivation, time) of 
past performance. In the intellectual investment framework, Gc represents not only the 
knowledge an individual was able to leam, but also his or her investment (e.g., 
engagement in and pursuit of learning opportunities) across time (Ackerman, 1996; R. B. 
Cattell, 1971, 1987).
Occupational performance, to a large degree, is dependent on one’s ability to 
master and understand the essential core of job knowledge (Postlethwaite, 2011). After 
mastering, the nature of work typically becomes more routine and less novel (Horn & 
Blankson, 2005). However, in some occupations (e.g., air traffic control, some creative
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fields, theoretical physics; Kanfer & Ackerman, 2004; Postlethwaite, 2011) individuals 
experience novelty to a larger extent, but such occupations are considered the exception 
rather than the rule. Thus, it has been hypothesized that intelligence is indirectly related 
to job performance. That is, intelligence is related to the acquisition of job knowledge, 
and in turn, job knowledge is related to job performance (Schmidt, 2002; Schmidt & 
Hunter, 1992; Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge, 1986). Furthermore, the importance of 
job knowledge can be seen when viewed negatively. Indeed, with respects to low levels 
of job knowledge, Schmidt and Hunter (2004) stated, “not knowing what one should be 
doing— or even not knowing all that one should about what one should be doing—is 
detrimental to job performance” (p. 170). In terms of human development, Gc is largely 
accumulated and maintained over one’s lifespan, whereas Gf begins to decline in early 
adulthood (Ackerman, 2013). Thus, if Gf were more critical for job performance (through 
knowledge acquisition), one would likely observe job performance mostly decreasing 
over time. However, Ng and Feldman (2008) found a small positive relationship between 
age and job performance, which supports Gc as being more central to job performance. 
Therefore, it follows that overall job performance is a partial proxy for job-specific 
knowledge.
Openness to Experience and Job Performance
Openness to Experience is conceptually related to job performance because the 
personality trait affects intrinsic motivation to learn (Major, Turner, & Fletcher, 2006; 
Minbashian, Earl, & Bright, 2013; Watanabe, Tareq, & Kanazawa, 2011), which is 
related to job performance. That is, individuals high on Openness to Experience typically 
have higher levels of learning motivation, which is related to job performance through its
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association with greater job knowledge and skill acquisition (Minbashian et al., 2013). 
Moreover, individuals high on Openness to Experience, in contrast to low, are not 
necessarily more capable of learning, but they are more prone to exhibit a mindset and 
perform behaviors that promote the acquisition of knowledge and skills (Rolfhus & 
Ackerman, 1999). Likewise, Openness to Experience is positively associated with the 
adoption of a learning goal orientation (Payne, Youngcourt, & Beaubien, 2007). 
Individuals with a learning goal orientation tend to use more effective learning strategies, 
set challenging goals, display greater effort and planning, and seek more feedback. 
Despite the conceptual links, empirical evidence has typically shown a weak relationship 
between Openness to Experience and job performance (Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001; 
Woo et al., 2014). One reason for the weak relationship may be due to the short time- 
interval (e.g., one year) commonly used in examining the personality and job 
performance relationship, which does not always account for the honeymoon effect 
(Minbashian et al., 2013).
The honeymoon effect (Helmreich, Sawin, & Carsrud, 1986) describes the idea of 
minimum performance differences among employees in the early stages of a job because 
motivation to learn and perform will be exhibited by new employees due to external 
influences. For instance, employees beginning a job will be aware that their performance 
is being monitored and evaluated; thus they will likely be motivated to perform initially, 
regardless of personality differences. Hence, short-term performance differences may not 
exist between employees with varying levels of Openness to Experience (all things being 
equal), but over the long term, higher levels of Openness to Experience will likely be 
more strongly related to overall job performance than lower levels. Openness to
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Experience’s stronger relationship over time is due to its association with intrinsic 
motivation to learn and learning goal orientation (Minbashian et al., 2013). Indeed, high 
Openness to Experience employees tend to continuously engage in learning activities 
throughout their careers, and as such, knowledge and skill acquisition continues to 
develop. Moreover, through learning goal orientation, these employees tend to seek 
mastery of tasks that will benefit their long-term performance, even at the expense of 
short-term performance (Harris, Mowen, & Brown, 2005). Empirically, evidence has 
shown support for Openness to Experience being a stronger predictor of job performance 
over time and being associated with slower performance deceleration and decline 
(Minbashian et al., 2013; Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991). Therefore, it follows that 
Openness to Experience, like intelligence, indirectly contributes to job performance by 
facilitating the acquisition of job-specific knowledge over time.
Time and Job Performance
The theme of time has been present throughout much of this paper, but the 
passage of time “is not particularly interesting to industrial and organizational (I/O) 
psychologists” (Beier & Ackerman, 2012, p. 721). Instead, the interesting aspects lie in 
the things that happen during the passage of time. For instance, people age, abilities 
change (e.g., decline, increase), employees develop skills, and individuals get promoted 
to new job positions. Indeed, it is well known that employee performance varies as a 
function of time (Dalai, Bhave, & Fiset, 2014). Ghiselli (1956) first noted the concept of 
dynamic criteria, which referred to “changes in the rank-ordering of individuals in their 
performance over time” (Barrett, Caldwell, & Alexander, 1985, p. 51). Likewise, 
Humphreys (1960) observed that past performance is not perfectly correlated with future
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performance. Different conceptual arguments have been offered to account for the 
observed temporal changes in employee job performance (see Beier & Ackerman, 2012; 
Lievens, Ones, & Dilchert, 2009); however, research has mostly ignored within-person 
performance changes due to normal human development (e.g., increased crystallized 
ability with age).
In the intellectual investment framework, the distinction between the different 
types of intelligences (i.e., Gf, Gc) and the incorporation of intellectual investment traits 
is important for a number of reasons; chief among them is accounting for both 
intelligence and personality. In particular, extensive research has examined the degree to 
which cognitive ability tests retain their predictive power over time (Barrett, Phillips, & 
Alexander, 1981; Campbell & Knapp, 2001; Deadrick & Madigan, 1990; Schmidt, 
Hunter, Outerbridge, & Goff, 1988), but only a few studies have examined the same for 
non-ability factors such as personality (e.g., Lievens et al., 2009; Minbashian et al.,
2013). More scarce, however, is the examination of the combined influence of 
intelligence and personality on the prediction of job performance over time. Thus, the 
primary aim of this dissertation is to use modem intelligence theory (intellectual 
investment theories) that account for a specific type of intellectual ability (i.e., Gc) and 
personality traits theorized to facilitate cognitive development (i.e., Openness to 
Experience) to improve job performance prediction longitudinally.
Primary Hypotheses
Intellectual investment theories propose that personality traits determine how, 
where, and when individuals invest their cognitive ability (Ackerman, 1996; R. B.
Cattell, 1971, 1987). Hence, differences in crystallized abilities or knowledge are
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believed to stem from general intelligence and the levels of investment. Empirical 
evidence supports the intellectual investment framework as an important theory for 
understanding and predicting employee job performance. Indeed, crystallized abilities 
have generally been shown to increase throughout adulthood (Horn & Cattell, 1967; 
Kaufinan et al., 2008). Moreover, crystallized ability was recently shown to be a stronger 
predictor of overall job performance than fluid ability (Postlethwaite, 2011). In addition, 
as a proxy investment trait, Openness to Experience has been shown to contribute to the 
development of Gc over time (Ziegler et al., 2012). Meta-analytic evidence has generally 
not found Openness to Experience to be a strong predictor o f job performance (Barrick et 
al. 2001; Woo et al., 2014), but the relationship is often examined in shorter time 
intervals (e.g., one year). However, longitudinal research and conceptual arguments 
suggest the relationship becomes stronger as a function of time (Helmreich et al., 1986; 
Minbashian et al., 2013). Thus, the following hypotheses were justified on the basis of 
the intellectual investment theories and research findings.
Hypothesis 1: Crystallized intelligence (Gc) will positively predict overall job 
performance over time.
Hypothesis 2: Employee age will positively predict crystallized intelligence (Gc).
Hypothesis 3: Openness to Experience will be positively related to crystallized 
intelligence (Gc).
Hypothesis 4: Openness to Experience will be a stronger predictor of overall job 
performance as job tenure increases.
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Hypothesis 5: Compared to the independent prediction of each, the combination 
of crystallized intelligence (Gc) and Openness to Experience will more strongly predict 
overall job performance over time.
Research Question
A common perception exists that considers personality traits, which represent 
fairly stable patterns o f feelings, thoughts, and behaviors, as relatively static (Roberts, 
Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006). Yet, an individual’s personality is subject to change 
(Specht, EglofF, & Schmukle, 2011). That is, several longitudinal studies have shown 
mean-level changes in personality traits across time (e.g., Haan, Millsap, & Hartka, 1986; 
Helson & Moane, 1987; Helson & Wink, 1992; Roberts, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2001; Robins, 
Fraley, Roberts, & Trzesniewski, 2001). However, personality theories differ in their 
prediction of how personality develops over a lifespan (Srivastava, John, Gosling, & 
Potter, 2003). Indeed, two prominent personality perspectives (i.e., biological and 
contextualist) hypothesize different age-related changes in personality.
The biological view of personality suggests a “plaster” hypothesis (Srivastava et 
al., 2003). In essence, the plaster hypothesis proposes that personality traits stop 
developing and changing by early adulthood, around the age of 30. The Five Factor 
Model of personality stems largely from a biological view. Indeed, McCrae and Costa 
(1996) postulated that personality traits result almost exclusively from biological origins 
and by early adulthood, they are fully matured (cf. Costa & McCrae, 2006). As such, 
minimal to no change is predicted after early adulthood. In contrast, the contextualist 
view of personality predicts plasticity (Srivastava et al., 2003). That is, personality traits 
are proposed to be multiply determined, and that they are subject to ongoing change
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throughout adulthood. Moreover, the change is thought to be due to many factors, and 
one’s social environment is thought to be an important factor influencing the change 
(Haan et al., 1986; Helson, Jones, & Kwan, 2002). Empirical investigations have started 
to shed some light on these different hypotheses.
Using personality traits from the Five Factor Model, several research studies have 
examined the degree to which personality changes and whether age-related change 
patterns emerge (e.g., Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000; Roberts et al., 2006; Specht et al.,
2011). The following discussion of these and other empirical findings will focus on the 
personality trait Openness to Experience, due to its important role in the intellectual 
investment theories. Examining the stability and consistent of personality, Roberts and 
DelVecchio (2000) found that people’s Openness to Experience levels became less 
consistent the longer the time interval used to re-measure people’s trait levels. Moreover, 
the authors observed that the stability of Openness to Experience generally increased with 
age (e.g., less stable in childhood, more stable in late adulthood). However, Openness to 
Experience never fully stabilized, which provides evidence against the plaster hypothesis 
suggesting personality traits stop changing in early adulthood. Despite the increased 
stability pattern observed, other empirical studies have found a more complex pattern.
Specht and colleagues (2011) found that Openness to Experience initially 
increases in stability with age, but becomes increasingly unstable around age 50.
Likewise, individual levels of Openness to Experience displayed a similar pattern with 
age. That is, individuals up to the age of 30 were higher on Openness to Experience than 
older individuals. Moreover, level of Openness to Experience was found to decrease 
around age 60. Other research has found comparable results. For instance, Roberts and
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colleagues (2006) found that Openness to Experience increases from adolescence to 
adulthood, and then decreases in older age (i.e., late 50s and on). However, Srivastava 
and colleagues (2003) found a slightly different pattern. The authors observed a gradual 
decrease in Openness to Experience levels with age. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that, on average, individuals generally have higher levels of Openness to 
Experience when they are younger compared to older, and as such, this has implications 
for the intellectual investment theories.
As previously discussed, Openness to Experience, as an investment trait proxy, is 
theorized to influence how, where, and when individuals invest their cognitive ability 
under the intellectual investment framework (Ackerman, 1996; R. B. Cattell, 1971,
1987). Moreover, higher levels of Openness to Experience are thought to result in further 
growth and establishment of Gc and knowledge (Chamorro-Premuzic & Fumham, 2005; 
von Stumm et al., 2011). Based on the within-person changes in personality traits 
research, it follows that younger individuals, on average, will have higher levels of 
Openness to Experience, than older individuals, and as such, younger individuals will 
develop and strengthen crystallized-type abilities at a faster rate than older individuals. 
However, the empirical evidence examined Openness to Experience in the general 
population, not specifically in an organizational context. It is reasonable to assume that 
individuals within an organization do not fully represent the general population. Many 
reasons likely contribute to this notion. For example, organizations commonly select 
individuals to hire, some employees are terminated for poor performance, individuals 
leave for other organizations, employees retire at different times, and people self-select
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into particular organizations. For reasons such as these, a hypothesis about age-related 
differences in Openness to Experience is not fully justified.
Research Question 1: Do employees of different ages differ in their levels of 
Openness to Experience?
CHAPTER TWO
METHOD
Participants
Data were obtained from 382 organizational employees (e.g., managers, 
subordinates) who represented a variety of functional specialization areas within the 
organization (e.g., Accounting, Sales). All 382 employees had three consecutive years of 
job performance ratings (i.e., ratings from each of 2012, 2013, and 2014). However, two 
hundred ninety of these employees were removed from analyses because they were 
missing intelligence-assessment data and personality-assessment data (one employee was 
removed due to missing only intelligence-assessment data). The missing data were due to 
the organization transitioning from a paper-based database to an electronic database and 
as such, not all of the paper-based assessment information was electronically available at 
the time of data retrieval. Statistical test were used to compare the removed and retained 
employees to determine if  differences between these two groups existed (see Appendices 
A and B for comparison between removed and retained employees). One statistically- 
significant difference was observed for sex; however, the intellectual-investment 
framework does not posit sex differences, so the differences observed do not hinder the 
study. Hence, the total sample for this study included 92 employees. The mean age of the 
employees was 41.93 years (SD = 10.13). The majority of the employees were male
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(n = 59, 64.10%). In addition, most of the employees were classified as White (n = 71, 
77.20%), 19.60% as African American (n = 18), and 3.30% as Asian (n = 3). The mean 
organizational tenure of employees was 7.67 years (SD = 4.78).
Instruments 
Gc
Employees completed the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (WGCTA) 
designed by Watson and Glaser (1980). The WGCTA is a measure of Gc (verbal 
reasoning; Fumham, Dissou, Sloan, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2007). The measure consists 
of five sub-domains: inferences (discriminating among degrees of truth about conclusions 
drawn from the given data), recognition of assumptions (understanding unstated 
suppositions in given assertions or statements), deduction (deciding whether particular 
conclusions necessarily follow the given information in statements), interpretation 
(evaluating evidence and determining if generalizations are justified given the data), and 
evaluation of arguments (discriminating between weak or irrelevant and strong or 
relevant arguments given a specific issue; Watson & Glaser, 1980). The five sub-tests 
contribute to the overall composite score of the WGCTA (Fumham et al., 2007). Each 
item has one correct answer and the maximum total composite score on the WGCTA is 
40. For this study, the overall composite score (i.e., the total number of correct responses) 
was used for analyses. Psychometrically, the WGCTA was found to have an internal 
consistency of .83, test-retest reliability of .89, and a criterion-related (overall job 
performance) validity of .39 (Watson & Glaser, 2006). In addition, the WGCTA was 
found to correlate with a widely used cognitive ability test, the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS), at .52 (Watson & Glaser, 2010).
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Openness to Experience
Employees completed the Occupational Personality Questionnaire (OPQ32i) 
developed by SHL (1999). For purposes of this study, items from the OPQ32i were 
selected by an informed-judges approach to form the Openness to Experience measure 
used in the study. The OPQ32i measures 32 job-related personality traits (Bartram & 
Brown, 2005). The personality measure contains forced-choice items and consists of 104 
quad sets. Sets of four statements (each relating to a different personality scale) are 
contained in each quad (Bartram, 2013). For all quads, employees endorse two of the four 
statements (one statement as “most like me” and the other as “least like me”). After 
completing, a score on each of the 32 personality ipsative scales is produced from a fixed 
number of points (i.e., 416) that are distributed among the scales (based on the statements 
endorsed). The Five-Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and normative trait scores 
can be derived from the OPQ32i. Although it is important to note that factor-analytic 
evidence suggests that the OPQ32i is larger in scope than the Five-Factor Model, 
containing aspects of motivation (e.g., need for power, need for control) not typically 
included in personality-trait definitions in the Five-Factor Model (Bartram, 2013).
Despite the larger scope, multidimensional IRT scoring methods have been developed to 
analyze the individual-choice patterns and from the patterns, Five-Factor normative trait 
scores can be derived (Bartram, 2013; SHL, 2009). Moreover, ipsative and normative 
scoring methods yield similar results, especially when the strict ipsative constraint (i.e., 
the use of all 32 scales) is removed (Baron, 1996; Bartram, 1996). In other words, the 
aggregation of only a subset of scales removes the constraint. Not surprisingly, of the 32
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scale scores, only a subset (viz. 25) are aggregated to yield normative personality traits 
from the Five-Factor Model (Bartram, 2013).
The OPQ32i scales that combine to produce the personality trait Openness to 
Experience are Variety Seeking, Innovative, Conceptual, Behavioral, and Conventional 
(Bartram & Brown, 2005; Bartram, 2013). All of these scales are positively related to 
Openness to Experience, except for Conventional (negatively related). The test publisher 
retains the scale weights for the Five-Factor conversion equations, which are needed to 
create the IRT-derived composite score of Openness to Experience (SHL, 2006).The 
scale weights were unavailable from the test publisher because those weights are 
considered to be protected intellectual property. Due to this, an informed-judges approach 
was utilized to conceptually link OPQ items to Openness to Experience.
It was essential that items could be identified from the OPQ32i could be mapped 
to Openness to Experience (Aguinis & Edwards, 2014). This correspondence was 
evaluated by providing three informed judges (i.e., individuals with advance knowledge 
in psychometrics and personality theory) a list of OPQ items and asking them rate the 
extent to which each item is conceptually representative of each of the Five-Factor 
constructs. Informed judges were 1-0 doctoral students who completed graduate 
coursework in both personality and in advance psychometric theory and who also passed 
qualifying exams. For each Five-Factor construct definition (Costa & McCrae, 1992), 
judges rated the extent to which OPQ items represented that construct using a 5-point 
Likert-type scale (1 = not at all, 2 = very little, 3 = somewhat, 4 = quite a bit, 5 = 
completely). An average deviation (AD) index was calculated to assess the agreement 
among informed judges (Burke & Dunlap, 2002; LeBreton & Senter, 2008). Items for
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Openness to Experience were retained if the AD index met or exceed 0.8 (signifying 
adequate levels of agreement for a 5-point scale; Burke & Dunlap, 2002), the mean 
ratings among the judges for the Openness to Experience construct were 3.5 or greater, 
and the mean ratings on the remaining Five-Factor constructs (i.e., Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Emotional Stability) were 3.4 or below (see 
Appendix C for ratings o f retained items). Based on these ratings, four items representing 
Openness to Experience were retained. All employees in the sample had a rating from 1 
to 5 (1 = key limitation, 2 = likely limitation, 3 = moderate, 4 = likely strength, 5 = key 
strength) on each of these OPQ items (e.g., describes themselves as a creative 
individual). These ratings map onto an extent scale (e.g., not like me, very much like me). 
For this study, these four items were summed to create a composite score for Openness to 
Experience (1 to 20 score range) and the composite score was used for analyses (the 
Openness to Experience composite score stemmed from the informed-judges approach, 
not from the IRT-derived scale weights from the test publisher). The intemal-consistency 
reliability for the four items retained was .52. The low reliability is likely due to 
Cronbach’s alpha being an inappropriate reliability measure for ipsative items because 
ipsative data violate the assumptions (e.g., independence of error) needed for Cronbach’s 
alpha (Meade, 2004). Likewise, the four items are summed to create a manifest variable, 
which carries the assumption that the measure is a reliable representation of the intended 
construct (Cole & Preacher, 2014). These four items were theoretically linked to 
Openness to Experience by an informed-judges approach, which provided evidence of 
content validity and meeting the manifest-variable assumption. Thus, the low intemal- 
consistency reliability obtained for the items does not hinder the study.
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Overall Job Performance
Overall-job-performance ratings for each employee were collected once annually 
through employee performance reviews (supervisory performance ratings). The ratings 
employees obtain range from 1 (“poor performance”) to 5 (“superior performance”), 
varying in half-point increments. Data collection of the overall-job-performance data 
spanned from 2012 through 2014. Thus, each employee had an overall-job-performance 
rating for 2012,2013, and 2014. For this study, the overall-job-performance ratings were 
used for analyses.
Procedure
Archival data were provided to the researcher by a large telecommunications 
organization located in the Southeastern United States. Data from the organization’s 
personnel records included intelligence-assessment data, personality-assessment data, 
overall-job-performance data, and demographic data (i.e., age, tenure, race, sex). The 
researcher and a human-resources representative removed (i.e., de-identified) all 
identifying information about the participants in the data prior to data analyses and 
participants were assigned a random participant code. The intelligence and personality 
data came from assessments previously administered by human-resources personnel as 
part of the process of staffing the organizational. Employee intelligence and personality 
data in the sample were only collected once for each employee; however, the exact time 
of data collection varied among employees. Specifically, intelligence and personality data 
were collected around the time each employee was hired, although some employees were 
assessed after being hired. However, information regarding the specific date each 
employee was assessed was not available to the researcher.
CHAPTER THREE
RESULTS
A preliminary exploratory analyses was conducted to assess univariate normality 
among the study variables. Of the seven variables, only two met the assumption of 
normality (i.e., Gc, Openness to Experience), while the remaining variables did not (i.e., 
Age, Tenure, JP 2012, JP 2013, JP 2014). See Table 1 for Shapiro-Wilk test of normality 
among study variables. From these statistics, the appropriate statistical test was (i.e., 
parametric or nonparametric) selected for each analysis. See, for reference, Table 2 for 
descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between study variables.
Table 1
Shapiro-Wilk Test o f  Normality Among Study Variables
Variables SW df P
Age .952 92 .002
Tenure .839 92 .001
Gc .983 92 .276
Openness to 
Experience .979
92 .136
JP 2012 .831 92 .001
JP 2013 .852 92 .001
JP 2014 .851 92 .001
Note: N =  92.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for and Bivariate Correlations Between Study Variables
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Age 41.93 10.13 -
2. Tenure 7.67 4.78 .229* -
3. Gc 29.74 5.05 .352** -.026 -
4. Openness 
to 10.50 2.49 -.052 -.175 .029
Experience
5. JP 2012 3.44 0.78 .125 .138 -.018 .038 -
6. JP 2013 3.30 0.82 -.074 .141 .008 .044 .262* -
7. JP 2014 3.28 0.82 .127 -.025 .199 .024 .277** .313**
Range 26-66 2-27 18-40 5-17 2-5.5 2-5.5 1.5-5.5
Possible
Range - - 0-40 0-20 0-5.5 0-5.5 0-5.5
Note-. N =  92. *p < .05. **/K.01. Two-tailed Spearman’s rho used for all non-normally distributed variables 
(see Table 1). Two-tailed Pearson’s r  was only used for the correlation between three & four.
Hypothesis 1: Gc Model Fit
The Latent Growth Modeling (LGM) was used to examine whether Gc was 
positively associated with overall job performance over time. Specifically, model fit was 
assessed after adding Gc (a time-invariant covariate) as a predictor of a latent-variable 
intercept (representing initial job performance ratings) and slope (representing the rate of 
change in job performance ratings) that were fitted to the overall-job-performance data 
(Preacher, Wichman, MacCallum, & Briggs, 2008). As mentioned before, the total 
sample consisted of 92 employees, which is close to the often-preferred sample size of 
100 (although there is no minimum sample-size requirement) for latent growth modeling
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(Curran, Obeidat, & Losardo, 2010). Preliminary exploratory analyses indicated the 
assumption of multivariate normality was met (Mardia’s coefficient = -.819, critical ratio 
= -.567, p  > .05). In addition, there were no multivariate outliers in the data. Model fit 
was assessed with the chi-square test statistic (x2), comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker- 
Lewis index (TLI), root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), and Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC; Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009; Preacher et al., 2008; 
Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & Muller, 2003). For a model with fewer than 12 
observed variables, cutoffs for good fit are as follows: a non-significant x2 value, a CFI 
value and a TLI value of .97 or better, and a RMSEA value below .08 (Hair et al., 2009). 
In addition, an AIC value was obtained for later comparison among models (Hooper, 
Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008; Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). After adding Gc to the 
model, the results indicated poor model fit, x2(7) = 17.930, (p = .012); CFI = .188; TLI = 
.304; RMSEA = .131; AIC = 31.930. In addition, path weights from Gc to the intercept 
(B = -.204; p  = .186) and slope (B = .016; p  = .174) were both not significant. Thus, due 
to the poor model fit and the non-significant path weights, Hypothesis 1 was not 
supported.
Hypothesis 2: Age and Gc
The variables of age and Gc were examined to see if they met the assumption of 
normality. According to the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality, Gc (SW= .983, d f= 92, p -  
.276) was normally distributed, but age (SW  = .952, df=  92, p  = .002) was not normally 
distributed. As a result, a nonparametric statistical test was used, Spearman’s rho (rs), to 
examine the association between age and Gc using the raw data (Howell, 2013). The
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results were statistically significant, r£92) = .352, p  = .001 and in the appropriate 
direction (i.e., a positive correlation). As such, Hypothesis 2 was supported.
Hypothesis 3: Openness to Experience and Gc
As with Hypothesis 2, the variable of Openness to Experience was examined to 
determine whether it met the assumption of normality. According to the Shapiro-Wilk 
test of normality, both Gc (SW= .983, df= 92, p  = .276) and Openness to Experience 
(SW  = .979, d f = 92, p  = . 136) were normally distributed. As a result, a parametric 
statistical test was used, Pearson’s r  (r), to examine the association between Openness to 
Experience and Gc (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). The results were not statistically 
significant, r(92) = .029,p  = .393, and as such, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Hypothesis 4: Openness to Experience Model Fit
As in Hypothesis 1, the study used LGM to assess whether the relationship 
between Openness to Experience and overall job performance was moderated by job 
tenure. Both Openness to Experience and Tenure were standardized (see Frazier, Tix, & 
Barron, 2004 for a review on testing moderation) and added as predictors (time-invariant 
covariates) of the latent-variable intercept and slope. In addition, a two-way interaction 
term (the product o f both standardized variables) was added as a predictor of the latent- 
variable intercept and slope (Frazier et al., 2004). Preliminary exploratory analyses 
indicated the assumption of multivariate normality was not met (Mardia’s coefficient = 
22.23, critical ratio = 10.88,/? < .05). In addition, there were two multivariate outliers in 
the data (Mahalanobis distance values were significant at the p  < .001) level. Removing 
these two outliers improved multivariate normality; however, the results of the LGM
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analysis without these outliers were not significantly different from the analysis with 
outliers. Therefore, they were kept in the analysis. The results indicated poor model fit, 
3^ (9) = 16.932, (p = .050); CFI = .217; TLI = -.305; RMSEA = .098; AIC = 52.932. Path 
weights from Openness to Experience to the intercept (B = .664; p  = .401) and slope (B = 
-.050; p  — .414) were both non-significant. Likewise, path weights from Tenure to the 
intercept (B = .630; p  = .437) and slope (B = -.046; p  = .460) were both non-significant. 
Similarly, path weights from the interaction term to the intercept (B  = .353; p  = .671) and 
slope (B = -.027; p  = .675) were both non-significant. Thus, due to the poor model fit and 
the non-significant path weights, Hypothesis 4 was not supported.
Hypothesis 5: Gc and Openness to Experience Model Fit
As in Hypotheses 1 and 4, LGM was used to assess whether accounting for both 
Gc and Openness to Experience was positively associated with overall job performance 
over time. To this end, Gc and Openness to Experience were added as predictors (time- 
invariant covariates) of the latent-variable intercept and slope. Preliminary exploratory 
analyses indicated the assumption of multivariate normality was met (Mardia’s 
coefficient = -1.416, critical ratio = -.812, p  > .05). In addition, there were no multivariate 
outliers in the data. The results indicated poor model fit, 3^ (8) = 18.240, (p = .019); CFI = 
.022; TLI = -.223; RMSEA = .119; AIC = 42.240. Path weights from Gc to the intercept 
(B = -.207; p  = .179) and slope (B = .016;/? = .167) were both non-significant. Likewise, 
path weights from Openness to Experience to the intercept (B -  .235; p  = .450) and slope 
(B = -.018 ;p  = .459) were both non-significant. Due to the non-nested nature of the 
models, a AAIC was computed to compare models (Burnham, & Anderson, 2002). The 
AAIC values obtain when this model and the Hypothesis 4 model were compared to the
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Hypothesis 1 model (the lowest AIC model) were 10.310 and 21.002, respectively. Both 
values were above three, which indicated that this model and the Hypothesis 4 model was 
not considerably better fitting than the Hypothesis 1 model (Burnham, & Anderson, 
2002). To support Hypothesis 5, the model needed to have good fit, significant path 
weights, the lowest AIC value, and have both AAIC values three or greater (when 
compared to the previous two models). However, none of these were met and as such, 
Hypothesis 5 was not supported.
Research Question 1: Age and Openness to Experience
As mentioned in Hypotheses 2 and 3, Age, unlike Openness to Experience, is not 
normally distributed. Thus, a nonparametric statistical test (rs) was used to examine the 
association between age and Openness to Experience (Howell, 2013). In particular, the 
study assessed whether the longitudinal evidence of age-related changes in Openness to 
Experience levels would be observed in an organizational context. That is, it was 
necessary to determine if employees in an organization would follow the same pattern 
that is observed in longitudinal studies of the general population (higher levels of 
Openness to Experience in people aged 30 and below and a slight decline in Openness to 
Experience levels in people aged 31 and above; e.g., Specht et al., 2011). To this end, the 
study examined whether employees aged 30 and below all had high levels of Openness to 
Experience and whether there was a slight negative decrease of Openness to Experience 
levels with age among employees aged 31 and above. First, the relationship among 
employees aged 30 and below (N=  12) was examined. The results were not statistically 
significant, 12) = .224,/? = .242. Second, the same relationship for employees aged 31 
and above (N — 80) was examined. The results were not statistically significant, >j(80) = -
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.081,/? = .239. Furthermore, another nonparametric statistical test, Mann-Whitney U test, 
was used to examine whether mean differences existed between the two groups (Howell, 
2013). The results were not statistically significant (£/= 473.00, z = -0.82,p  = .935). 
Though the data points available were not as robust as preferred, statistical tests were run 
on the limited data. Stemming from the aforementioned analyses, a picture of the pattern 
of Openness to Experience in the organization was observed. This pattern will be 
addressed in Chapter Four and how it departed from pattern observed in the longitudinal 
studies.
CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION
The psychometric tradition of intelligence and Spearman’s notion of g  have 
largely prevailed as the dominant approach to intelligence used in 1-0  psychology, 
despite the fact that other approaches to intelligence exist. This is perplexing given that g  
is inadequate to explain either the growth or the decline of intelligence that occurs over 
the course of normal human development. Indeed, accumulating evidence suggests that g  
is an oversimplified model for explaining the development of cognitive abilities over 
time. That is, certain cognitive abilities (e.g., Gf) peak and begin declining in early 
human development, while others (e.g., Gc) generally increase throughout one’s lifespan. 
Given this limitation to g, a more modem approach to intelligence was used that accounts 
for both the psychometric and developmental aspects of intelligence. Specifically, the 
work drew on the intellectual-investment framework due to its incorporation of normal 
cognitive development as well as its incorporation of personality traits thought to 
partially account for individual differences in cognitive abilities; incorporating these 
elements is thought to improve the prediction of job performance longitudinally. To this 
end several hypotheses were proposed and a research question to explore aspects of this 
framework in an organizational setting. Stemming from this study, a theoretical 
contribution as well as practical contributions were made.
60
61
Overall, most o f the hypotheses were not supported, but a notable exception was 
observed. First, there was no positive association between Gc and job performance 
longitudinally. Given the accumulated evidence of intelligence’s strong relationship with 
job performance, the failure to obtain support for the first model (Hypothesis 1) was quite 
troublesome. Moreover, a positive relationship between Gc and job performance was not 
observed for any time point (see Table 2). This finding was unexpected considering that 
conceptual link between Gc and the ability to acquire job knowledge. The job knowledge, 
in turn, was expected to be related to job performance. A number of limitations to this 
study likely contributed to this non-significant finding; however, the discussion of such 
limitations are saved for the limitation section because such limitations affect other 
findings as well. Second, no support was found for a positive association between 
Openness to Experience and job performance longitudinally (Hypothesis 4). This finding 
was, again, unexpected due to Openness to Experience’s conceptual link to learning job 
knowledge, which is related to job performance. Indeed, even after accounting for the 
honeymoon effect, Openness to Experience was not positively associated with job 
performance. That is, the study accounted for tenure because Openness to Experience 
was expected to be more strongly related to job performance as tenure increased (i.e., 
honeymoon effect). However, the lack of support would be more worrisome if a more 
psychometrically-established measure o f Openness to Experience was used (discussed in 
the limitation section). Third and perhaps not surprisingly (given the previous two 
models), no support was found for both Openness to Experience and Gc being positively 
associated with job performance longitudinally (Hypothesis 5). The lack of support for 
this hypothesis was quite damaging to the intellectual-investment framework for
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predicting job performance longitudinally. Indeed, this model should have had the best fit 
under the intellectual-investment framework due to the incorporation of Gc and Openness 
to Experience (an investment trait proxy) posited to partially account for individual 
differences in the development of Gc.
In addition to the model-fit hypotheses, other hypotheses and a research question 
using a different statistical procedure were examined. For Hypothesis 3, there was no 
support for the presence of a relationship between Openness to Experience and Gc. This 
finding was unexpected given the empirical evidence showing a positive relationship 
between Gc and Openness to Experience. Indeed, under the intellectual-investment 
framework, Openness to Experience should be related to Gc because from a theoretical 
perspective, Openness to Experience partially guides one’s investment into further 
developing Gc. This finding would be more worrisome if a psychometrically-sound 
measure of Openness to Experience was used. Hypothesis 2 was the notable exception 
among the otherwise unsupported hypotheses. Indeed, the notion that Gc generally 
increases with age was supported. This finding is in line with theory and with other 
empirical studies. Moreover, this finding provides additional support to the idea of the 
WGCTA being largely a measure of Gc.
With regard to the research question, the study examined whether age-related 
differences in Openness to Experience levels existed in the sample. Specifically, 
longitudinal evidence suggests that Openness to Experience levels are higher for 
individuals aged 30 and below than the remaining age groups. Moreover, longitudinal 
evidence suggests that Openness to Experience gradually declines over one’s lifespan. 
These longitudinal studies have typically examined changes to Openness to Experience
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levels in the general population. However, the study examined this phenomenon in an 
organizational context. As such, it was reasonable to expect that the organization’s 
workforce would not fully represent the general population due to numerous reasons 
(e.g., organizations select individuals to hire and terminate poor performers). Though 
there was limited data, the same pattern in the sample as is expected in the general 
population was not observed. That is, the study did not find mean differences in 
Openness to Experience levels between individuals 30 and below and individuals 31 and 
above. Likewise, a gradual decline of Openness to Experience as age increased was not 
observed. In fact, there was no discemable pattern in the sample, which suggests that the 
organization did not have a fully-representative general-population sample. Taken 
together, these findings (both expected and unexpected) have theoretical and practical 
implications as well as provide future research directions.
A theoretical contribution was made to the intellectual-investment framework by 
integrating the contextualist perspective of personality and investment traits. That is, it is 
theorized that intellectual-investment traits are subject to change throughout one’s life; 
however, due to the limitations of the study, theoretical contribution was not empirically 
supported. As such, future research is recommended to test this theoretical contribution 
by using a larger sample size and a psychometrically-sound measure of Openness to 
Experience in other organizational settings. This theoretical contribution is important to 
empirically investigate because intellectual-investment traits are defined as stable 
individual differences (von Stumm et al., 2011), yet the most frequently used proxy for 
investment traits is Openness to Experience, which is subject to ongoing change (e.g., 
Roberts et al., 2006; Specht et al., 2011). Indeed, longitudinal evidence points to younger
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individuals (aged 30 and below) having, on average, higher levels of Openness to 
Experience than the remaining age groups. Moreover, Openness to Experience levels 
have been found to gradually decrease with age. As such, theoretical age differences in 
investment trait levels likely result in differing rates of development of crystallized-type 
abilities. That is, younger individuals, on average, will acquire crystallized-type abilities 
at a faster rate than older individuals. Although Openness to Experience is a proxy for 
intellectual-investment traits, it stands to reason that intellectual-investment traits are 
subject to the contextualist view of continuous change throughout one’s lifespan. Thus, 
this theoretical contribution provides an opportunity for researchers and future studies to 
improve job performance prediction.
Even though the findings did not support the intellectual-investment framework in 
an organizational setting, practical suggestions are discussed based on theory and other 
empirical findings. The intellectual-investment framework is believed to have the 
potential to improve our prediction of job performance over and above g. Indeed, 
intelligence is not the sole determinate of job performance and as such accounting for an 
additional factor (i.e., personality) will likely allow improved job performance prediction. 
Moreover, 1-0 psychology rarely examines the combination of personality and 
intelligence and as such, this framework provides a theoretical rationale for accounting 
for both. Thus, 1-0 practitioners can assess for both Gc and Openness to Experience 
when staffing an organization. Compared to the personality trait Conscientiousness, 
placing more or equal importance on Openness to Experience in staffing is a departure 
from the evidence contained in meta-analytic studies (e.g., Barrick et al., 2001; Woo et 
al., 2014). Yet, the intellectual-investment framework and the honeymoon effect suggest
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that Openness to Experience is an important predictor of job performance. Again, no 
support was found for Openness to Experience’s importance in predicting job 
performance longitudinally, but given the assembled theoretical evidence, it is believed 
the best information would cause us to conclude that Openness to Experience needs to be 
accounted for in staffing decisions (Minbashian et al., 2013). To this end, future research 
should continue to investigate both Gc and Openness to Experience for use in predicting 
job performance longitudinally. That being said, improving job performance prediction is 
one benefit of this framework; however, other benefits exist.
Future research should investigate whether the intellectual-investment framework 
can improve diversity in an organization. Specifically, research evidence has shown that 
intelligence tests can result in large differences among racial groups (e.g., Roth, Bevier, 
Bobko, Switzer, & Tyler, 2001). These differences often lead to a lower selection rate for 
minorities and as such, adverse impact often occurs, which is prohibited by Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, under the intellectual-investment framework, 
crystallized-type abilities should not be viewed as static. That is, a score on a Gc test can 
be view simply as a snapshot of one’s current Gc levels, not a non-changing ability. 
Coupling this normal human development of Gc with investment traits (e.g., Openness to 
Experience), 1-0 practitioners can lower cutoff scores for Gc in staffing. That is, two 
individuals can have the same Gc levels, but differ on Openness to Experience levels. In 
the context of staffing, these differences in Openness to Experience levels help account 
for differences in job-performance trajectories between these two Gc-identical 
individuals. Extending this notion forward, a racial-minority candidate with slightly- 
lower Gc but higher Openness to Experience could be selected over a racial-majority
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candidate with slightly-higher Gc but lower Openness to Experience because the racial- 
minority candidate will likely continue developing Gc at a faster rate than the racial- 
majority candidate and hence, in time, higher Gc levels should lead to higher job 
performance. That being said, an 1-0 practitioner or organization adopting this 
framework for staffing purposes must also consider the legal ramifications that could 
arise and the timeframe in which such an approach would be beneficial to the 
organization.
Age discrimination needs to be considered under this framework. In particular, 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967 and as modified in 1986, 
prohibits the discrimination of employees aged 40 and over. This law has implications for 
the intellectual-investment framework. For example, two individuals could be equal in 
terms of Gc and Openness to Experience but differ in age (e.g., one individual being 25 
and the other being 50). An 1-0 practitioner or organization may be tempted to select the 
25-year-old candidate due to an expected increase in Openness to Experience levels to 
age 30 and/or (at the very least) a smaller decline of Openness to Experience over any 
given period of time. Thus, over time, the 25-year-old candidate is expected to obtain a 
higher level of Gc and develop Gc at a faster rate than will the 50-year old candidate. If 
an organization systematically selects employees based on these age-related changes in 
Openness to Experience and Gc, age discrimination is likely to occur. However, this 
framework can also help an organization avoid the legal ramifications of adverse impact. 
Hence, the implementation of this framework for staffing purposes must be accompanied 
by legal considerations.
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Limitations and Future Directions
Although this study has made important contributions to the study of intelligence 
in the workplace, more empirical investigations must be undertaken to fully understand 
the intellectual-investment framework in an organizational context. Specifically, a 
number of limitations hindered the ability to find support for the majority of the 
hypotheses. First, a psychometrically-sound measure of Openness to Experience was not 
used in this study (The converse equations were unavailable from the test publisher 
needed to create a psychometrically-sound measure due to the equations being considered 
intellectual property). Indeed, an informed-judges approach was used to create an 
Openness to Experience composite score using items that stemmed from an ipsative 
measure. Second, the longitudinal data consisted of only three time points. Normal 
human development of crystallized-type abilities may not change enough over three years 
for any substantial differences to be observed. Indeed, detectable changes may result after 
time spans of 10,20, or 30 years (Ackerman & Beier, 2012). That being said, this long­
term view may not be appealing for organizations in industries that experience high 
levels of turnover among employees. Specifically, organizations in these industries may 
see the majority of their employees exit before the intellectual-investment framework is 
beneficial for staffing purposes. That is, not enough time will likely pass for individual 
differences in investment to account for differences in performance trajectories. Third, 
artifactual changes in reported performance data may have been responsible for ill-fitting 
models. The archival data came from an organization that was experiencing large-scale 
organizational change; during the years in which analyzed job-performance data were 
collected, the organization had acquired a few smaller organizations and had added these
68
organizations’ workforces to their own. Large-scale organizational change has been 
theorized to impact employees’ cognitive and affective readiness for change, which have 
been considered antecedents of job performance (e.g., Rafferty, Jimmieson, &
Armenakis, 2013); such impact may lead to decreases in reported performance. Indeed, 
there were statistically-significant declines in the mean job-performance ratings used in 
the study. A Friedman test indicated that differences in job-performance ratings existed 
(5^ (2) = 11.362, p  = .003) and post-hoc analyses revealed a statistically-significant 
decline in job-performance ratings both from 2012 (M — 3.44) to 2013 (M=  3.30; p  = 
.036) and from 2012 to 2014 (M=  3.28; p  = .008; note that the Friedman test and its 
associated post-hoc analyses are non-parametric and based on rank orders; mean values 
are reported here for interpretability). Such interference with job-performance data 
outside of the confines of ordinary organizational functioning may have contributed to 
the lack of support found for many of the study’s hypotheses. Fourth, the sample size 
used was adequate for LGM (Curran et al., 2010), but a larger sample size may help 
better evaluate the intellectual-investment framework in staffing. Fifth, the job- 
performance measure was a single item, which is likely less reliable in capturing 
performance changes when compared to multi-item measures. That is, a multi-item 
measure of performance may be more sensitive to capturing changes in performance over 
time. Nevertheless, single-item job-performance measures tend to correlate strongly with 
a similar multi-item measure of performance (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1993; Cellar,
Miller, Doverspike, & Klawsky, 1996). Moreover, the job-performance measure was a 
subjective rating from supervisors, so future research could incorporate single and 
multiple objective measures of job performance. Lastly, the sample was relatively
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homogenous (77.20% White). In addition, the mean age of employees was 41.93 years 
and the majority o f the employees were male (64.10%), so future studies could 
incorporate a more-representative sample. Taken together, these limitations offer 
improvements that can be addressed in future studies.
Conclusions
Overall, no support was found for using the intellectual-investment framework in 
predicting job performance longitudinally. However, a number of limitations contributed 
to the lack of support and as such, researchers should conduct further empirical 
investigations of this framework in an effort to improve job-performance prediction. 
Furthermore, the study has made a theoretical contribution to this framework with regard 
to investment traits, which can be examined by researchers. Thus, although no support 
was found for the intellectual-investment framework in the study, researchers and 
organizations can use the intellectual-investment framework to improve their 
understanding of normal cognitive development that occurs in employees over time and 
how such change impacts job performance.
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APPENDIX A
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST FOR COMPARING RETAINED 
AND REMOVED EMPLOYEES
94
95
Mann-Whitney U Test for Comparing Retained and Removed Employees
Variables N
Mean
Rank
Sum of 
Ranks U z P
Age
Retained
Removed
Tenure
92
290
208.52
186.10
19183.50
53969.50
11774.50 -1.698 .09
Retained
Removed
Sex
92
290
192.88
191.06
17745.00
55408.00
13213.00 -0.138 .89
Retained 
Removed 
JP 2012
92
290
166.51
199.43
15319.00
57834.00
11041.00 -2.877 .01
Retained 
Removed 
JP 2013
92
290
197.04
189.74
18128.00
55025.00
12830.00 -0.579 .56
Retained 
Removed 
JP 2014
92
290
173.87
197.09
15996.00
57157.00
11718.00 -1.810 .07
Retained
Removed
92
290
198.85
189.17
18294.00
54859.00
12664.00 -0.760 .45
Note: According to the Shapiro-Wiik test of normality, all variables did not meet the assumption of 
normality p<.002.
APPENDIX B
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION BETWEEN 
RETAINED AND REMOVED EMPLOYEES
96
97
Demographic Information Between Retained and Removed Employees
Variables N %
Race
White
Retained 71 77.20
Removed 194 66.90
African-American
Retained 18 19.60
Removed 91 31.70
Asian
Retained 3 3.30
Removed 2 0.70
Sex
Male
Retained 59 64.10
Removed 136 46.90
Female
Retained 33 35.90
Removed 154 53.10
APPENDIX C 
INFORMED-JUDGES’ RATINGS
98
99
Informed-Judges’ Ratings
OPQ Items
AD
Index
Openness to 
Experience Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness
Emotional
Stability
Describes 
themselves as a 
creative 
individual
0.0 5.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0
Questions 
traditional 
methods when 
generating ideas
0.0 5.0 1.3 2.3 2.0 1.3
Challenges the 
rules when 
implementing an 
idea
0.67 4.0 2.7 3.3 2.7 1.3
Ideas and 
solutions may 
lack intellectual 
depth
0.67 4.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0
Note: Values for the Five-Factor constructs represent the mean ratings among the informed judges (N=  
3). AD Index values represent the informed-judges’ agreement for Openness to Experience.
